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REGULATING RESEARCH WITH
DECISIONALLY IMPAIRED INDIVIDUALS:
ARE WE MAKING PROGRESS?
Diane E. Hoffinann*
Jack Schwartz**
Evan G. DeRenzo***

INTRODUCTION'"
The National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC or
Commission), as well as advisory panels in two states (New York and
Maryland) have recently issued recommendations urging new
regulation of research with decisionally impaired individuals.! These
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1976; M.S., Harvard School of Public Health, 1980; LD.Harvard Law School, 19S6.
* Assistant Attorney General and Director, Health Policy Development, Maryland Oftce
of the Attorney General. B.S., University of Maryland Baltimore County, 1972; J.D., Yale
Law School, 1975.
**Bioethicist, Washington Hospital Center. B.A., Wheaton College, 1973; M.A.,
George Washington University, 1976; PhD., Univ. of Maryland College Park, 1986.
***The authors wish to thank Sai Deepa Saggare for her rezearch and editorial
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'See NAnONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COsuSSION, RESEARCH INIOLVImG PERSONS WITH
MENTAL DISORDERS THAT MAY AFFcT DECiSION.AXING CAPACITY 2 (1998) [hereinafter
NBAC REPORT]; NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH ADVISORY WORK GROUP ON
HUMAN SuBJEcr RESEARCH INVOLVING THE PROTECIED CLASSES, RECO.EIDATIONS ON THE

OVERSIGHr OF HumAN SUBJECT RESEARcH INVOLVING THE PRoTEcTED CLASSES 2S-33 (1993)
[hereinafter NEw YORK REPORT]; and JACK SCHWARTZ, OFFCE OF THE MARI&ILwD ATrORN;EY
GENERAL, FINAL REPORT OF THE ATORNEY GENERAL'S WoRKING GROUP ON RESEARCH
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recent governmental initiatives have resurrected a quarter-century old
policy debate over whether this kind of research should be governed by
regulations beyond those applicable to all human subjects.
Considerations underlying the central question include how the
population needing special regulatory protection should be defined,
what limitations should be placed on the risk to which subjects are
exposed, and how much discretion about these matters should be left to
research investigators and local review boards.
Fueling this debate is a core ethical issue: how can research with
subjects who are unable to consent be justified? The Nuremberg Code,
a post-war foundational document regarding research ethics, states that
the "voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential." 2
"This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give
consent...." This language effectively rules out research involving
decisionally incapacitated subjects and is cited as the central authority
by those objecting to such research.4
Yet, the prohibition suggested by the Nuremberg Code is itself
ethically troublesome to many who point out that, "[b]ecause new
treatments must eventually be tested in persons suffering from the
relevant condition, a policy totally excluding incapable subjects from
research would preclude the development of improved treatment for
persons with serious psychiatric disorders, dementia, and other
mentally debilitating conditions."5 A source of authority for those who
Involving Decisionally Incapacitated Subjects 1 (1998) (on file with the DePaul Journal of
Health Care Law) [hereinafter Maryland Report].
2
The Nuremberg Code (1947), reprintedin JAY KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN

BINGS 305-06 (1971).
4Some commentators have suggested that the Nuremberg Code's wording, which "seems
to rule out research with children, with emergency patients, and with the decisionally
impaired," is more expansive than the Code's intended scope. Jonathan D. Moreno, Rcgulation
ofResearch on the DecisionallyImpaired: History and Gaps in the CurrentRegulatory System,

I J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 1, 12 (1998). The judges who issued the decision embodying
the Code may only have intended "to rule out non-beneficial and highly risky experiments with

easily coerced subjects such as prisoners." Id.
'REBECCA DRESSER, NATIONAL BIOETHIcS ADVISORY COMMIssION, Research Involving
Personswith Mental Disabilities:A Review ofPolicy Issues and Proposals,in RESEARCH
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argue that it is ethical to conduct research with the decisionally
impaired is the Declaration of Helsinki (Declaration).6 The Declaration
includes in its principles the following: "Where physical or mental
incapacity makes it impossible to obtain informed consent, or when the
subject is a minor, permission from the responsible relative replaces
that of the subject in accordance with national legislation."7 This
statement appears to assume the passage of national legislation
permitting family members to consent to participation in research for an
incapacitated individual. The implication of the statement is that
sometimes the pursuit of scientific knowledge justifies research that the
Nuremberg Code would prohibit, although the Declaration does not
fully account for the circumstances under which proxy consent would
be ethically permissible
These two documents provide the historical context for the
examination of subsequent efforts to regulate research with this
population. Phrases from the documents have become battle flags for
advocates. Those who believe that research with decisionally impaired
subjects is ethically suspect, a danger to be avoided, often use the
Nuremberg Code as the starting point for arguments that this research
should be severely restricted.9 Those whose premise is that research
with decisionally impaired subjects is ethically permissible, a necessity
in the fight against serious illness, often use the Declaration of Helsinki
as the starting point for arguments that this research must not be
hobbled with restrictions.'"
This article will examine how these

INVOLVING PERSONS WmI MwETAL DISoRDERs ThAT MAY AFFECT DEcLsI0o,,uING CAPACny
ComMISSIONED PAPERS 5, 7 (1998)
6
See World Medical Association, Declaration of Helsinki (1948), adopted by the World
Medical Assembly in 1964 and revised in 1975 and 1983, in THE ET'cs oF RESmRCH
INVOLVInG HuMN SUBjETS - FACnDG THE 21sT CENTURy 433 (Harold Y. Vanderpool, ed.,

1996).
gThe Declaration suggests that when research is solely for the advancement of scientific
knowledge-that is, contains no element of possible direct therapeutic benefit for the
subjects---"[t]he subjects should be volunteers...." Id
9

See KATZ, supranote 2, at 305-06.
'0See id
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seemingly irreconcilable moral views play out in the policymaking
process.
Over twenty-five years ago, the U.S. Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (DHEW) published an early working document
as a prelude to proposed rules on research with "individuals
institutionalized as mentally infirm."" The proposals in the working
document and proposed rules published a few years later 2 would have
significantly restricted-perhaps even effectively ended-this research.
The proposals ultimately were abandoned, primarily because of
comments from researchers that they would be too restrictive and
burdensome on the research community.' 3
Since DHEW abandoned its regulatory effort, little has changed, at
least in terms of governmental policy directives. Federal regulations
merely call on Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) to be attentive to the
need for "additional safeguards.. .to protect the rights and welfare" of
research subjects who "are likely to be vulnerable to coercion or undue
influence, such as.. .mentally disabled persons.... "
No state
comprehensively regulates research with decisionally impaired
individuals. 5

"See Protection of Human Subjects, 38 Fed. Reg. 31,738, 31,738 (1973) (proposed

Nov. 16, 1973).
12See Protection of Human Subjects, Research Involving Those Institutionalized as
Mentally Infirm, Reports and Recommendations for Public Comment, 43 Fed. Reg. 11327
(Mar. 17, 1978).
13See Moreno, supra note 4, at 13.
1445

C.F.R. § 46.11 l(b) (1999).

15See Diane E. Hoffmann & Jack Schwartz, Proxy Consent to Participationof the
DecisionallyImpaired in Medical Research - Maryland's Policy Initiative, 1 J. HEALTH CARE
L. & POL'Y 123, 125-26 (1998).
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This article reviews the history of attempts to regulate research
with the decisionally impaired and examines the question whether the
recent proposals will merely reprise failed efforts of the past or instead
mark progress toward consensus on the appropriate level of regulatory
protection. In so doing, this article addresses some of the significant
changes in the relevant research, social, and legal arenas during the past
quarter-century as well as the more complex regulatory research
environment that exists today, and their likely impact on the
policymaking outcome.
EARLY REGULATORY EFFORTS: THE 1970s
Initial Proposals by the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
The federal government first gave serious attention to the issue of
research with those lacking decisional capacity in October 1973. At
that time, the Secretary of DHEW issued a notice of "proposed
rulemaking" and commented that "DHEW through the National
Institutes of Health, had appointed a special study group to review and
recommend policies and special procedures for the protection of
children, prisoners, and the institutionalized mentally infirm in
research.... " A draft of the study group's report was published in the
Federal Register in November, 1973.' The report was not considered
proposed rulemaking but rather "a draft working document" for public
review and comment.S
The draft defined "mentally infirm" as the "mentally ill, the
mentally retarded, the emotionally disturbed, the psychotic, the senile,
16Protection of Human Subjects, 38 Fed. Reg. 31,738, 31,73S (1973) (proposed Nov. 16,
1973). 1
7

See id
"See id The Federal Register Notice, in fact, stated "[it must be clearly understood by

the reader that the material that follows is not proposed rulemaking in the technical se se, and

is not presented as Departmental, Public Health Service, or NIH policy. Rather it is a draft
working document on which early public comment and participation is invited." IA The
drafters also recognized the controversial nature of the proposal. In the introduction to the
draft, Robert S. Stone, Director of the National Institutes of Health, commented that "[tlhere
may be elements in the recommendations which will provoke debate and controversy." Id
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and others with impairments of a similar nature, residing as patients in
an institution, regardless of whether or not the individual has been
determined to be legally incompetent."' 9 Individuals institutionalized
as mentally infirm were considered especially in need of protections for
two reasons. First, they "might lack the... capacity to comprehend
relevant information, and to make informed judgments concerning their
participation" in research.2 ° Second, "they experience a diminished
sense of personal integrity as a result of confinement in an
21
institution."
Of particular focus was the question of informed consent and how
it might be obtained in order to conduct research with individuals in
this category.' In the section on "general policy considerations," the
draft stated:
Whereas it is clear by law that consent of a parent or legal
representative is valid for established and generally accepted
therapeutic procedures performed on a child or an
incompetent adult, it is far from clear that it is adequate for
research procedures. In practice, parental or guardian
consent generally has been accepted as adequate for
therapeutic research, although the issue has not been
definitively resolved in the courts. When research might
expose a subject to risk without defined therapeutic benefit
or other positive effect on that subject's well-being, parental
or guardian consent appears to be insufficient. 23

'91d at 31,740.

20

1d

21See Protection of Human Subjects, 38 Fed. Reg. at 31,745.
22See id.at 31,740.
2
aI3d The draft also raised the possibility that legal guardians might not always have the
best interest of the institutionalized individual foremost in their decisionmaking. Because longterm management of patients with mental disabilities is very expensive and time-consuming,
the draft speculated that a research proposal that might "reduce either the expense or the
supervision required in caring for such persons might be appealing, whether or not there is
correlative benefit to the patient." Idat 31,745.
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The draft concluded that, in general, research on the mentally
infirm was not acceptable 4 The draft did leave the door open,
however, for some types of research. These included "projects in
which: the proposed research concerns diagnosis, treatment, prevention,
or etiology of the disability from which [the subjects] suffer; the
necessary information can be obtained only from those subjects; or the
studies concern institutional life per se." '6 The draft further required
that the subject's legal guardian give consent to the individual's
participation in any research protocol, and that where the individual had
"sufficient mental competency to understand what [was] proposed and
to express an opinion as to his or her participation!' that the individual
give his or her consent.27
In cases where a protocol included mentally infirm subjects, the
research was to be overseen by a "Protection Committee."2' The
Protection Committee was to be overseen by an "Organizational
Review Committee of the institution in which the research" was to be
conducted or by which the research was sponsored? The Protection
Committee?' was to provide guidance in the selection of subjects,
monitor the progress of the research with special attention to "adverse
effects on subjects," "evaluat[e] the process and reasonableness of
consent of the legal guardian and (where applicable) of the subject,"
and advise the legal guardian and subject of the appropriateness of the
subject's continued participation in the research.3' Members of the
committee could not have "any association with the research under
review and the majority of members could not have any association

24

See iaL

25

See id
26See Protection of Human Subjects, 38 Fed. Reg. at 31,745.
27Id at 31,748.
2"Il
at 31,745.
29
d
30
See idat 31,746 (stating that the Protection Committee w.as to be composed of at le.-azt
five members who would be competent to "deal with the medical, legal, social and ethical
issues 31
involved in the [proposed research]").
See Protection of Human Subjects, 38 Fed. Reg. at 31,748.
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with any organization or individual conducting or supporting the
[research]. ' 2
The Organizational Review Committee, in addition to its
obligations for all research on human subjects within an institution, was
to ensure that all aspects of the research would be "ethically appropriate
for performance on healthy individuals," "conduct at least one on-site
visit" to the institution where the research was being performed,
"prepare a report of the visit, 33 and "review and approve or modify the
procedures proposed by the applicant to be followed by the Protection
Committee in subject selection and recruitment." 4
Based on critical commentary received on the draft report, in
August 1974, DHEW published its proposed rules for research on
vulnerable subjects."
When these proposed rules were issued,
however, the agency's Federal Register notice pointed out that
"[c]oincidentally with the development of the notice of proposed
rulemaking set forth [herein]," the National Research Act was passed
by both Houses of Congress and signed by the President. 6 The Act
established an eleven-member National Commission for the Protection
of Human Subjects in Biomedical and Behavioral Research. 7 The
Commission was charged with identifying the basic ethical principles
that should underlie the conduct of human subject research and
32

1d at 31,746. Furthermore, "no more than one-third of the members [could] be
individuals engaged in research, development, or demonstration activities involving human
subjects."
Id
33
1d. at 31,748. The report was to include "discussion of such matters as living
conditions, availability of medical care, and quality of food." Id.
34

1d

35

See Protection of Human Subjects, 39 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,652 (1974) (to be codified

at 45 C.F.R pt. 46) (proposed Aug. 23, 1974).

On May 30, 1974, HEW published basic

regulations governing research with all human subjects, See Protection of Human subjects, 30
Fed. Reg. 18,914 (1974) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46)(proposed May 30, 1974). DHEW

stated in the preamble to those regulations that it would "propose further rules to provide
additional protection for research subjects with diminished capacity to provide informed
consent including institutionalized individuals with mental disability." Protection of Human
Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. 53,950, 53,950 (1978) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46) (proposed
Nov. 17,
1978).
36
See Protection of Human Subjects, 39 Fed. Reg. at 30,648.
37See National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348, § 201(b)(1), 88 Stat. 342 (1974).
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developing guidelines for research to assure that it be conducted in
accordance with these ethical principles?' More specifically, the
Commission was required to address research with children, prisoners,
and those institutionalized as mentally infirm.l
In light of the four hundred and fifty comments regarding the
November 1973 proposed guidelines for research on vulnerable
populations, DHEW made several modifications to its earlier draftfW
DREW received over forty comments specifically directed at the
provisions covering research on the institutionalized mentally infirm!'
One common criticism was the use of the term "infirm. ' Commenters
noted that it reflected an "antiquated notion of mental illness!" 3
DREW agreed with the concern and changed the term to disabled."
In contrast, DREW rejected suggestions that, in its view,
weakened what it considered essential protections for those
institutionalized as mentally infirmY' For example, some argued that
the restriction limiting research with this population to protocols that
related to the particular subject's impairment was too narrow.04 Instead,
they suggested, the provision should include "any illness from which
the person suffers so that, for example, an institutionalized mentally
disabled person with cancer could not be denied the benefits of research
in cancer therapy." 7 Despite these arguments, the Department
concluded that research unrelated to the cause of this vulnerable
population's mental disability was not appropriate because of the
potential risks to the group.4 As in the earlier draft, research could

3

SSee iad at § 202(a)(1)(A)(i).

39See ide at § 202(a)(2).
4

0See Protection of Human Subjects, 39 Fed. Reg. 30,648 (1974) (to ba codified at 45
C.F.R. pt. 46) (proposed Aug. 23, 1974).

41See id at 30,652.

42

See id
4'See ide

44See id
45See Protection of Human Subjects, 39 Fed. Reg. at 30,652.
4Ssee
id
4
7

Id

48

See id
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only be performed on those institutionalized as mentally disabled if it
was "related to the etiology, pathogenesis, prevention, diagnosis, or
treatment of mental disability or the management, training or
rehabilitation of the mentally disabled and [sought] information which
[could] not be obtained from subjects who [were] not institutionalized
'
mentally disabled."49
Furthermore, DHEW retained the original scope of the proposal,
largely rejecting suggestions that regulations should be established for
research involving "students, laboratory employees, seriously ill or
terminal patients, the noninstitutionalized mentally disabled, and other
special groups."5
DHEW's response to this suggestion was that
"abuses relat[ed] to these groups [were] less evident and that they
[were] afforded the protection of the existing regulations" governing all
human subjects. 5 DIHEW did state, however, that it would consider
dealing with those who were legally incompetent but not
institutionalized in a subsequent notice of proposed rulemaking 2
The National Commission's Process and Recommendations
DHEW did not move forward in this area while the National
Commission was performing its own analyses regarding research with
those institutionalized as mentally infirm. The task of the Commission
on this topic specifically was to:
(1) Identify the requirements for informed consent to
participation in biomedical and behavioral research by the
institutionalized mentally infirm, and
(2) investigate and study biomedical and behavioral
research conducted or supported under programs
administered by the Secretary of HEW and involving the

49JId

at 30,655.

50See Protection of Human Subjects, 39 Fed. Reg. at 30,648.
51Ia
52See id at 30,652.
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institutionalized mentally infirm to determine the nature of
the consent obtained. 53
The Commission was to use this information as a basis for making
recommendations to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
"to assure that biomedical and behavioral research conducted or
supported under programs administered by him met the requirements
respecting informed consent identified by the Commission."'
On April 10, 1976, the Commission conducted a public hearing on
the issue of research involving the mentally infirm." Commentators
included both researchers and advocates for this population. The
comments reflected the environment in which research on this
population was conducted and the attitudes of those engaged in this
research at the time.56 Virtually all of those commenting supported the
research enterprise, believing it necessary to make progress in the care
and treatment of the mentally infirm." The differences among the
comments focused on the extent to which research on this population
should be regulated beyond existing DUEW requirements for human
subject research generally."
The view of researchers that additional regulation may be
counterproductive was perhaps best expressed by Dr. Roger Meyer, of
Harvard Medical School, who commented that "the current
environment is hostile toward needed research in biology and
behavioral sciences." 9 He and others also expressed the view that it
was inappropriate to categorize all individuals with mental disabilities
as unable to give consent; doing so, in fact, ran "counter to modem
concepts of mental illness and to court decisions which have restored
their civil rights and limited judgments of incompetency."' 53

Protection of Human Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,328 (Mar. 17, 1978).

4Id
55
See
5

id (summarizing the testimony of fourteen individuals).
6See id

57See id
58See Protection
- 91"d at 11,352.

6Olad

of Human Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,352-55.
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Among advocates for the mentally infirm, the statement by the
American Bar Association's (ABA) Commission on the Mentally
Disabled was the most detailed.6" While the ABA's Commission
generally supported the practice of research with this population, it
asserted that "experimentation" on this group should only be permitted
when, among other criteria, "the research poses no more than minimal
risk."62 The ABA Commission further argued that nontherapeutic
research should not be performed over the objection of any subject, no
matter how the objection is expressed.6" Therapeutic research should
only be carried out on those institutionalized as mentally infirm under
these criteria, with two exceptions.' More than minimal risk research
could be performed if "absolutely necessary to preserve the life, health
or physical safety of the research subject" and if there was evidence of
a "high level of therapeutic justification, the objections of [the subject]
could be overridden with proper third-party consent and review

6t

See id
The ABA Commission advocated the following prerequisites:

621d

(1) The protocol has scientific merit, verified by an independent
multidisciplinary committee;
(2) medical care, direct care and other institutional services are
sufficient;
(3) the experimentation will not reduce the amount or quality of therapy
available to research subjects or to other residents;
(4) the research poses no more than minimal risk;
(5) the research is related to mental disability and seeks information that
cannot be obtained from other subject groups; and
(6) the information sought is of significance for the advancement of
acknowledged scientific or medical goals.
1d at 11,353.
63
See Protection of Human Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,353.
4See id
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procedures."65 Furthermore, the term "therapeutic" was to be strictly
defined "in terms of individual necessity and benefits." Of all the advocacy groups, Stewart Brown, representing the
Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens, took a position that
was perhaps most protective of potential subjects.67 He argued that
those conducting research on this population should be "qualified and
licensed" and that a "regulatory-type agency should enforce regulations
and impose sanctions where violations [were] discovered.""3
On March 17, 1978, DHEW published Notice of the National
Commission's Report and Recommendations on Research Involving
Those Institutionalized As Mentally Infirm 9 and asked for public
comments before May 16, 1978.7" In the Report, the Commission
recommended that research involving those institutionalized as
mentally infirm be conducted or supported only when "an Institutional
Review Board"' reviewed the research design, the qualifications of the
research investigator, and the adequacy of pre-clinical studies.' With
respect to the rights and welfare of human subjects, the IRB was to
determine that:

6SIl
65

1d

at 11,355.
(Ssee
Protection of Human Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,355.
69
The Commission retained the term "mentally infirm" because this term vas used in the
1974 National Research Act. The Commission acknowledged, however, the comments
received on DHEW's November 16, 1973, proposed policy stating that the term should not be
used. See
idat 11,329.
70
67M

See id
See National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348, § 474(a), 88 Stat. 342 (1974) (stating

71

that "[t]he Secretary [of HEW] shall by regulation require that each entity which applies for a
grant or contract under this Act for any project or program which involves the conduct of
biomedical or behavioral research involving human subjects submit in or with its application
for such grant or contract assurances satisfactory to the Secretary that it has established (in
accordance with regulations which the Secretary shall prescribe) a board (to be known as an
'Institutional Review Board') to review biomedical and behavioral research involving human
subjects conducted at or sponsored by such entity in order to protect the rights of the human
subjects of such research.")
72See Protection of Human Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,328, 11,330.
raid
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there are good reasons to involve institutionalized
persons in the conduct of the research;
risk of harm or discomfort is minimized by using the
safest procedures consistent with sound research
design and by using procedures performed by
diagnostic or treatment purposes whenever possible;
adequate provisions [have been] made to protect the
privacy of the subjects and to maintain
confidentiality of data;
selection of subjects among those institutionalized as
mentally infirm will be equitable; [and]
adequate provisions [have been] made to assure that
no prospective subject will be approached to
participate in the research unless a person who is
responsible for the health care of the subject has
determined that the invitation to participate in the
research and such participation itself will not
interfere with the health care of the subject.

73

Of particular concern to the Commission was that individuals
institutionalized as mentally infirm not be included in research studies
where it was possible to obtain the same information from
noninstitutionalized individuals.74 The IRB, then, was to consider
whether the research being proposed would be "exploitive" of the
institutionalized population by assessing whether the research would be
73

Id

74

See id at 11,33 1. Under contract with the Commission, the Survey Research Center at
the University of Michigan (SRC) examined research being conducted around the country with
individuals institutionalized as mentally infirm. The SRC report was based on a sample of
studies reviewed by IRBs at 61 institutions. Research on this population constituted 9 percent
of the research reviewed by these IRBs. In terms of subject selection, the SRC found that in
"13% of projects involving the mentally infirm, the investigator did not mention the mental
condition of the subjects as a factor in subject selection." The Commission speculated that it
was possible that these studies could have been conducted on other populations and may have
been conducted on this population as a means of convenience. Id. at 11,341.
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"'relevant to the subjects' emotional or cognitive disability, whether
individuals with the same disability [would be] reasonably accessible to
the investigator outside the institutional setting, and whether the
research [was] designed to study the nature of the institutional process
or the effect of some aspect of institutionalization on persons with a

Concerning selection of subjects within the
particular disability."
institution, the Commission recommended that subjects be selected so
that "any burdens of research do not fall disproportionately on those
who are least able to make decisions regarding participation in
'
The Commission also addressed the situation in which a
research."76
potential subject's physician or therapist was involved in the proposed

research." In those situations, in order to avoid conflicts of interest, the

Commission recommended that "independent clinical judgment" be
obtained to determine the appropriateness of including a patient in the
proposed research."

The Commission's report included an influential analysis of the
relationship among the risk-benefit profile of the research, subject
assent, and third-party consent 79 If the research in question involved

no more than minimal riskS0 and the subject was incapable of
75

d. at 11,331.

761

77Protection of Human Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,331-32.
78M The SRC report, done for the Commission, found that in approximately 25 parcent
of the research with the mentally infirm, investigators enrolled their own patients. See id at
11,341.
79
The SRC study investigators found that written consent ws sought in more than 80
percent of the research they reviewed involving the mentally infirm. Third-party consent %as
obtained in approximately one third of these cases. Third-party consent was most frequently
obtained in research involving the mentally retarded and was obtained from the subject's
parents, other relatives, or legal guardians. See id at 11,342. When interviewed, "most
investigators reported that third party consent served to protect subjects "very well" or "fairly
well," but almost one-fifth of the investigators indicated otherwise. Reasons given included
the third party's not being able to understand the research or not caring about protecting the
subject's rights. Id
8inimal risk was defined by the Commission to mean the "ris-k (probability and
magnitude of physical or psychological harm or discomfort) that is normally encountered in
the daily lives, or in the routine medical or psychological examination, of normal persons." Id.
at 11,332. For subjects institutionalized as mentally infirm, the Commission elaborated that
"routine examination procedures present no more than minimal risk if the likely impact of such
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consenting, the Commission stated that the research must be "relevant
In addition, the Commission
to the subject's condition." 8'
recommended that the subject "assent"'32 or, at least not object to
participation. 3 If the subject did object, the subject could not
participate in the research unless authorized to do so by a court of
competent jurisdiction.'$ In such cases, the Commission recommended
that this authorization not be sought unless the research included an
intervention or monitoring procedure that would be of direct benefit to
the subject.8 5 In addition, "where appropriate," the Commission
recommended that the IRB appoint "a consent auditor" to "observe the
consent process and determine.. .whether each prospective subject
consents, or being incapable of consenting, assents or objects to
participation in the research."8 6

procedures on them is similar to what would be experienced by normal persons undergoing the
procedures." Id On the other hand, the Commission Report stated that an:
IRB may determine that prospective subjects who are institutionalized
as mentally infirm are likely to react more severely than normal persons
to certain routine procedures; in such instances, the procedures present
more than minimal risk to the subjects.... For each research protocol,
the IRB must determine the degree of risk that would be presented to
normal persons and then consider whether such risk is heightened by
the illness or institutionalization of the prospective subjects or class of
subjects.
Id.
81

d
The Commission used the term assent to "describe authorization by a person whose
capacity to understand and judge is somewhat impaired by illness or institutionalization, but
who remains functional." Protection of Human Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,332. It further
explained the standard as requiring "that the subject know what procedures will be performed
in the research, choose freely to undergo those procedures, communicate this choice
unambiguously, and be aware that subjects may withdraw from participation." Id. The
standard was "intended to require a lesser degree of comprehension by the subject than would
generally support informed consent." Id.
83
See id
"See id.
82

85

See id.

86Id
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If the research under consideration involved greater than minimal
risk, the Commission recommended that the research not be performed
on this population unless it included an intervention that held out the
prospect of direct benefit" to the subject or included a monitoring
procedure "necessary to maintain the well-being of those subjects:"3
This risk would be acceptable if "all available treatments for a serious
condition [had] been tried without success, and the remaining option
[was] a new intervention under investigation."" If the subject was
incapable of consenting, the Commission recommended that the subject
assent to participation." If the subject was incapable of assenting but
did not object to participation, the Commission stated that the
permission of a guardian or court should be obtained." If, however, the
subject objected to participation in the research, his or her participation
could only be authorized by a court of competent jurisdiction and only
if the prospective benefit could not be obtained other than by
participating in the research.92 For this type of research, the
Commission recommended that an IRB determine the need to appoint
an auditor "to observe and assure the adequacy of the consent
process..."'93 and if there was a "substantial question about the ability of
the subjects to assent or there [was] a significant degree of risk
involved in the research, the appointment of a consent auditor by the
IRB would be appropriate."94

87See Protection of Human Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,332. The Commission
described a direct benefit as one that held out the possibility of fairly immediate benefit. Id at
11,333.
SSSee id at 11,333.

E91d
93See id at 11,332.
9

tSee id
92Protection of Human Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,332. An example of this typ- of

situation, according to the Commission, would be where a new drug is being tezted by the
FDA for effectiveness and its use is not permitted outside of the drug trial. Sce id at 11,333.
931d The auditor was not to be involved "(except in the capacity of consent auditor)
with the research for which subjects [were] being sought." In addition, the auditor was to be a
person "familiar with the physical, psychological and social needs of the clas of prosp-ective
subjects,
as well as their legal status." Id
94
i
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The Commission also addressed research that posed greaterthan a
minimal risk with no possibility of direct benefit to the subject
population.95 Under these circumstances, the research could be
conducted only if the anticipated risk of participation in the research
was a "minor increase over minimal risk,"96 the knowledge expected
from the research was "of vital importance for the understanding or
amelioration of the type of disorder or condition of the subjects" or
97
could "reasonably be expected to benefit the subjects in the future."
Regarding participation of subjects incapable of giving consent,
participation would be permissible if the subject assented to
participation." If the subject was incapable of assenting but did not
object to participation, the subject could participate only with the
consent of a legally appointed guardian.99 If the subject objected to
participation, he or she could not participate in the research.' 0 For this
level of risk, the Commission recommended the mandatory
appointment of a consent auditor by the IRB to observe the consent
process and "determine whether each subject consents, or is incapable
of consenting and assents, or objects to participation.''.

95

See id at 11,334.

96Id,at 11,333.
97Protection of Human Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,333. Such benefit could be remote

to the subjects, "such as the eventual development of better treatment for their condition." Id.
at 11,334. As the Commission wrote in its later Belmont Report:
Some populations, especially institutionalized ones, are already
burdened in many ways by their infirmities and environments. When
research is proposed that involves risks and does not include a
therapeutic component, other less burdened classes of persons should be
called upon first to accept these risks of research, except where the
research is directly related to the specific conditions of the class
involved.
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SuBJEcrs OF BIOMEDIcAL AND
BEHAVioRAL RE.SEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: EThCAL PRINCIPLS AND Gummdos FOR THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECrS OF RESEARCH 19 (1978) (emphasis added).
98
See Protection of Human Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,334.

99See id
""'See id
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This recommendation was particularly controversial even among
Commission members."
One commissioner, in fact, submitted a
dissenting statement focusing on this recommendation, in which he
argued as folows:
Since it is accepted that normal persons should not be
enrolled in nontherapeutic research with more than minimal
risk unless they can give informed and meaningful consent, it
is doubly unreasonable that the institutionalized mentally
infirm should be so enrolled when society has had so much
recent concern for their greater protection, and when they
live in environments which seriously discourage any kind of
decision making and the nature of their illnesses weakens
their abilities to choose responsibly in most of life's usual
103
situations.
Lastly, the Commission addressed research that involved greater
than a minor increase above minimal risk and did not hold out the
prospect of direct benefit to the subject.'" Under these circumstances,
the research could only be performed if.
(1) The research present[ed] an opportunity to understand,
prevent or alleviate a serious problem affecting the health or
welfare of persons institutionalized as mentally infirm; and
(B) A national ethical advisory board and, following
opportunity for public review and comment, the head of the
responsible Federal department or agency have determined
that:
(I) The conduct of the research will be in accord with the

1o1I

In all cases, the consent auditor was to be independent of the research team. See

id at 11,357.
102 Id

"°Protection of Human Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,358 (Robert E. Cooke,
Commissioner, dissenting).
'°4See id at 11,334.
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basic ethical principles that should underlie the conduct of
research involving human subjects; and
(II) adequate provisions are made for obtaining consent or
assent of5 each subject or permission from a guardian of the
10
person.
The Commission stated explicitly that "because of the importance of
the ethical issues at stake, debate [on this type of research] should be in
a public forum, and conduct of the research should be delayed pending
for Congress to
Congressional notification and a reasonable opportunity
06
research."'
proposed
the
regarding
action
take
Revisions by the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare
On November 17, 1978, eight months after the Commission's Report
was printed in the Federal Register, DHEW issued its proposed rules on
Research Involving Those Institutionalized as Mentally Disabled.'7
The proposed rules took into consideration the more than one hundred
comments received on the Commission's report. 8 While the proposed
rules "in essence" accepted the Commission's recommendations, they
For
did depart from the Commission in some significant ways.'
example, the proposed rules included a statement that DHEW was
considering a requirement that consent auditors be appointed for all
research with this population (even minimal risk research) and that an
independent advocate be appointed for each research subject." '

I05 d"
106
d
07
Protection of Human Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. 53,950, 53,950 (1978) (to be codified at
45 C.F.R. pt. 46) (proposed Nov. 17, 1978). DHEV formally rejected the term "mentally
infirm" and adopted the term "mentally disabled" in large part as a result of comments received
on their November 16, 1974 proposed policy." Id.
'°0 See id

'09See id

"0 See id. at 53,952. An advocate was defined to mean an individual appointed by the
IRB to act "in the best interests of the subject' and who would be "construed to carry the
fiduciary responsibilities of a guardian ad litem" toward the subject. This individual could not
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For subjects determined capable of assenting but not consenting,
DHEW also stated that it was considering whether to: 1) follow the
Commission's recommendation to allow the subjects' participation if
their guardians or legally authorized representatives (LAR), as DHEW
termed them,"1 consented, or 2) require additional protections
including the "consent of.. .the Secretary, based upon the advice of an
Also, with regard to subjects
expert panel, or.. .an advocate.""'
incapable of assenting, the Department stated that it was considering
whether to:
(1) [b]ar their involvement in such research (on the
assumption that needed research could be done using other
subjects);
(2) adopt the Commission's recommendation, which
would permit their participation if they do not object and
the legally authorized representative and a court of
competent jurisdiction give their approval;
(3) require, in addition to the approval of the legally
authorized representative and the court, approval by the
Secretary; or
(4) require, in addition to that of3the representative and the
court, approval by an advocate1
These rules were clearly more protective of research subjects
institutionalized as mentally disabled than those proposed by the

have any financial interest in the institution conducting or sponsoring the research. Moreover,
an advocate was to be familiar with "the physical, psychological, and social needs and the legal
status of the class of individuals institutionalized as mentally disabled in the institution in
which the research is conducted." Id. at 53,955.
1'The term "legally authorized representative" was substituted by DHEW for the term
"guardian" by the Commission "since the latter [it said] is normally associated with persons
having responsibility for minors, while these regulations apply both to adults and minors
institutionalized as mentally disabled." IdL at 53,952.
" 2Protection of Human Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. at 53,952.
13Id

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol. 3:547

Commission. They were also the subject of considerable controversy.
In fact, the proposed rules were ultimately rejected primarily because of
comments from researchers that they would prevent needed research."'
According to Al Jonsen, a former member of the National Commission
and prominent bioethicist, "officials at the National Institute of Mental
Health (NIMH) and the Agency for Drug Addiction and Mental Health
Association, objected that the recommendations would stifle important
research with their populations.""' Groups like the Association of
American Medical Colleges also found the proposed regulations overly
burdensome, commenting that the requirements of consent auditor,
patient advocate, and appointment of' n6a guardian were "ponderous
mechanisms of no demonstrated value."
Twice in the next several years, the President's Commission for
the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and
Behavioral Research urged the Department to take up this issue
again." ' However, according to at least one source, the Department
"declined to do so, reportedly due to a lack of consensus on the need for
them as well as the alleged adequacy of existing regulations."1 '

" 4Although these proposed rules were never adopted, DHEW did adopt rules for
research on other vulnerable populations including prisoners, pregnant women and fetuses and
children. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.205 (2000) (providing for "additional protections pertaining to
research, development, and related activities involving fetuses, pregnant women, and human in
vitro fertilization").
5
sSee Jonathan Moreno, supranote 4, at 13.
116
Letter from John A. D. Cooper, M.D., President of AAMC, to Honorable Joseph A.

Califano, Jr., Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (Jan. 16, 1979) (on file with the
authors).
t17
See Clarence J. Sundram, In Harm's Way: Research Subjects Who Are Decisionally
Impaired,I J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 36,45 (1998).
1181d (citing Robert J. Levine, Proposed Regulations for Research Involving Those
Institutionalizedas Mentally Infirm: A ConsiderationOf Their Relevance in 1996, IRB, Sept.-

Oct. 1996, at 1).
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SOCIETAL TRENDS INFLUENCING THE NATURE OF
POTENTIAL REGULATION:
FROM THE 1970s TO THE 1990s
Between the late 1970s and late 1990s, there were no new significant
efforts to regulate research with the decisionally impaired population.
Yet, during that time a number of significant societal, legal and medical
changes took place that profoundly influenced attitudes toward the care
and treatment of the decisionally impaired and may have affected the
more recent proposals to regulate research with the decisionally
impaired as well as how different groups now view the need for
regulation of research with this group. These developments, described
below, provide the backdrop for analyzing the recent proposals for
regulation and the political reaction to them.
Deinstitutionalization
In the first half of the 20th century, aggressive efforts at finding
treatments and cures for mental illness were undertaken in institutional
settings." 9 Although psychoanalysis or talk therapy, based on the work
of Sigmund Freud in the late 1800s, had become the cornerstone of
psychiatric practice, other, more interventionist, techniques were also
developed with mixed results.' Electroconvulsive therapy, a way of
producing seizures through the administration of electrical shocks,
became widespread in the treatment of psychosis.' While effective in
some patients, electroconvulsive therapy often resulted in disconcerting
side effects, such as memory loss." During the 1930s, a surgical
procedure known as a lobotomy, in which the frontal lobes of the brain

9

See MICHAEL H STONE, HEALNG TIE MIND: A HLSTORY OF PSyCITIRY FOm
ANTQUITY
TOTHE PENT 139-174 (1997).
2
"

1 ,See id
21
1 See

RALPH RESNER & CMUSTOPHER SLOBOGiN, LAW & ThE MeNTAL HEALTH SYSTEM:
CVI AND CmImiN ASPECTs 870 (2 nd ed. 1990).
122See Note, Regulation of Electroconrdksive Therapy 75 MtCH. L. REV. 363, 36S
(1976).

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol. 3:547

were removed, was shown to reduce aggressiveness in animals.13 A
modified form of the procedure was performed on humans.'
While helping some of the mentally ill, these treatments were
generally ineffective in the treatment of schizophrenia and the number
of individuals in the country with the illness grew considerably.125 In
1954, however, a breakthrough in treatment of schizophrenia came with
the availability of a drug called chlorpromazine,'26 a tranquilizer. The
new drug was able to sedate individuals without the systemic effects of
other tranquilizers available at the time.' Those who administered the
drug to schizophrenic patients in mental institutions reported dramatic
results. 28 In the late 1950s and early 1960s, a number of other
antipsychotic drugs came on the market.'
None were any more
effective but they differed in terms of side effects and dosing
requirements.130 These "antipsychotics" became widely available and

allowed many who had spent years in institutions to live in the
3
community. 1
12See

VicroRiA SiERRow, MENTAILLN Ss 45 (1996).

124See idt at 46 (stating that "[b]y 1960, about fifty thousand lobotomies had been
performed in America, most on patients labeled incurable. Lobotomies reduced violent
behavior in some patients but did not restore normal functioning. Many were left in a
vegetative state, with severe brain damage; others developed seizure disorders. About 5
percent died.")
125See id. ("In 1904, about two out of every one thousand Americans were diagnosed as
schizophrenic.
By 1955, that number had doubled").
26
1 Chlorpromazine is also known by the trade name Thorazine. It was the first of the
antipsychotics, which are sometimes referred to as neuroleptics or drugs that act on the nervous
system. See MmuuIm WEBSTER'S COLLEGATE DiCnONARY 781 (10th ed. 1993) (a neuroleptic

is "any of the powerful tranquilizers (as the phenothiazines) used especially to treat psychosis
and believed
to act by blocking dopamine nervous receptors...").
127See RENA SPIEGEL, PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 36-40 (3rd ed. 1996).
See also Richard Mindham, PharmacologicalAspects of Mental Illness, in MENTAL ILLNESS:
CHANGES AND TRENDS 206 -207 (Phillip Bean, ed., 1983).
128See SPIEGEL, supranote 127, at 39- 40; see also Mindham, supra note 127, at 206.
129
See STONE, supra note 119, at 188. Examples of these early antipsychotics include
haloperidol
(Haldol) and thioridazine (Mellaril). See id.
130See Mindham, supranote 127, at 207.
131These drugs were specifically aimed at schizophrenia. While the drugs were
effective, they all had significant side effects. Some of these side effects included "acute
dysonia (muscle spasms) and akathisia (restlessness). Id. at 208. In addition, these agents
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In 1955, the number of residents in mental hospitals was at its all
time peak of 559,000."' As the "introduction of neuroleptic drugs
became widespread1'" and individuals could be treated as outpatients,
a long-term decline in the number of residents in these institutions
began.134 By 1970, the number of inpatients in these facilities was
339,000.135 By 1978, the trend toward deinstitutionalization was well
on its way. 136 In 1989 the number of institutionalized individuals was
approximately 100,000.137
While the process of deinstitutionalization began in the 1950s,
fostered by expos6s of sometimes abysmal conditions 13S and by the
availability of major tranquilizers, 139 certain events accelerated the
deinstitutionalizaiton effort. 40 The push for deinstitutionalization was
part of the larger "community mental health movement" advocated by
President John F. Kennedy.' As part of this movement, "[p]oliticians,
mental health professionals, and others spoke out on behalf of the
mentally ill, challenging the long-standing stigma against them. The
government took a more active role in promoting mental health and

were thought to have a greater likelihood of producing a long-term, irreversible neurological
side effect known as tardive dyskinesia (uncontrollable muscle spasms). See id
"2 See Richard W. White, Jr., Mental Patients' Rights Should Be Limited, in MENTrAL
ILLNEss: OppOSNG VfiwvpomS 195, 199 (William Barbour ed., 1995).
1

33eId
13'See id
'34See id

136See id at 199-200.
37

1 See DAVID

A. ROCHEFORT, FROM PooHousEs TO HOMELESsSFss: PoLicy A/ALyss

ANDMENTAL
HEALTH CARE 219 (1993).
3
1'
See id In an illustrated exposd of the problems of mental health institutions in LfZ
magazine in 1946 entitled "Bedlam 1946," journalist Albert Maisel called thee institutions "a
shame and a disgrace." Id at 672. Some reports revealed that patients were being us:!d as

guinea pigs to test improbable hypotheses about the causes of mental illne=s. One physician,
Dr. Henry Cotton, removed the tonsils and teeth of many patients, to prevent the infections that
he believed could cause mental illness. Other physicians, believing that extreme fevers might
reduce mental illness, exposed patients intentionally to infectious diseases such as malaria and

typhoid39to bring on a high fever. SHEERow, supranote 123, at 60.

1 See STONE, supranote 119, at 203.
140See Albert R. Roberts & Linda Farris Kurtz, HistoricalPerspectiveson the Care and
Treatment of the Mentally 11114 J. SOCIOL & SOCIAL WELFARE 75, 85 (19S7). id
14'See id at 82-85.
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making services available to more people throughout the country.'14

These activities included increased funding for the study of mental
illness14 ' and a promise of increased federal support for the care of the
44
1

mentally ill.
A combination of aggressive litigation and federal financial

support for individuals outside of institutions further accelerated the

deinstitutionalization of mentally ill individuals. 1 45 A 1972 law suit,
Wyatt v. Stickney, 146 advanced the claim that involuntarily committed

patients had a right to treatment. 147 This treatment entailed, as one
commentator opined, "staffing ratios and physical amenities so

expensive that hospitals could not afford to meet them.'

4'

As a result,

while a few institutions did improve their conditions, many state mental
hospitals began to discharge patients more rapidly in order to achieve
improved staff-to-patient ratios. 49 According to one author, in addition
to other lawsuits, the availability of federal Supplemental Security

t 42

See SHmRow, supranote 123, at 55. This governmental interest in mental health was

in large part a result of the military's experience during World War II. About 18 percent of

draftees were rejected because of some type of mental illness. See id. at 56. Individuals who
served in the war were also vulnerable to mental health problems due to the prolonged stress of
military service. See id
14'See iadat 57 (stating that, in 1946, Congress established the National Institute of
Mental Health, which was to improve services for the treatment of mental health and conduct
research on the causes of mental health problems).
'"See SHERROw, supra note 123, at 64. In 1955, Congress established the Joint
Commission on Mental Illness and Health, which conducted the first "nationwide survey of
mental illness in the United States." L at 64. In its 1960 report, the Commission made note of
the disparity that had long existed in funding for mental health programs as compared to other
medical problems and blamed the inequity "in part on unfair public perceptions of mental
illness-for example, that it is often not recognized as illness and that the behavior of the
mentally ill frightened and upset people." lad In 1963, Congress passed the Mental Health
Centers Act, which was to provide funds to communities to construct and staff community
based mental
health centers. See idat 65.
145See RALPH REISNER, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
ASPECTS46 1041 (3d ed. 1999).
1 See Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
147See ide
at 373.
'"See White, supra note 132, at 198.
'4See ide
at 199.
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Insurance 0(SSI) in 1974 furthered the deinstitutionalization
movement.15
While many mentally ill patients were able to make the transition
from institution to community successfully, residing in halfvay houses
or other supervised settings, others were not.'
Many, including the
elderly with dementia, as well as those under sixty years of age with
chronic mental illness, vent to nursing homes."52 Also, because most
states did not provide adequate outpatient services for this group, many
became homeless and received no care or treatment." One might even
describe them as having been socially abandoned."
This trend toward deinstitutionalization shifted the focus of
regulation of research from the institutionalized mentally disabled to
the broader population of individuals with decisional impairments.
Autonomy and the Decisionally Impaired
Other changes in the law and public policy reflect a movement from
paternalism to autonomy, a recognition of the rights of the decisionally
impaired to make their own decisions about a multitude of issues
affecting their lives. 55 This paradigm shift has led, for example, to
some individuals who suffer from mental illness themselves becoming

15 0

See id See also ANN BRADEN JOHNSON, Our OF BEDLAM: THE TRuiH ABOUT

98 (1990) (stating that in "the first year SSI was available, state
hospitals saw a nationwide decrease in population of 13.3 percent, the largest decrease ever").
15
See JOHNSON, supranote 150, at 119.
152See iii (quoting a 1977 U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) Report stating that
nursing homes had become the "largest single place of care for the mentally ill of all agefs).
"5See id at 181 (stating that after the institutions were closed, the mentally ill were to be
given care in halfway houses or community centers, but officials and taxpayers never came up
with enough money).
154See Michael Winerip, Bedlam in the Streets, N.Y. TZIES, May 23, 1999, Section 6
(Magazine), at 42. See also Richard Jed Wyatt & Evan G. DeRenzo, Scienceless to Homlcss,
234 SCL 1309, 1309 (1986) (identifying a societal failure to conduct the research necessary to
determine whether deinstitutionalization would, in fact, benefit the institutionalized).
155
See Arlene Mayerson, 1970's and Onward-The Civil Rights Perspective, in THE
LEGAL RiGmsrI OF Cn
s wrh MENTAL RETARDATION 105 (Lawrence A. Kane, Jr., et al.,
eds., 1988).
DEINSnT'uONALIzATiON
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more active participants in the debate about the regulation of research
with this population." 6
The Disability Rights Movement
The disability fights movement, in particular, has had a profound effect
on the care and treatment of those with cognitive and decisional
impairmentS. 5 7 In The Legal Rights of Citizens with Mental
Retardation,Arlene Mayerson states that
[A] profound shift in disability policy occurred in the decade
of the 1970's. Rising visibility and activism in the disability
rights movement, as well as passage of the first broad crossdisability piece of legislation, challenged traditional ideas
about disability. The anthem of the disability rights
movement became self-determination--disabled people
demanded control over their own affairs on every level, from
governmental decision-making to personal care. They
attacked the medical model as oppressive. Doctors, social
workers and other professionals were no longer accepted as
the primary spokespersons;
instead, disabled people began to
158
themselves.
speak for
As a result of the movement, disabled individuals established advocacy
groups "to promote self-advocacy and independence."' 59 Groups such
as "People First' 6 emerged to enable individuals "with mental
disabilities to gain a sense of power over their own lives, by developing
means of self-help and support and establishing mental health and
mental retardation services responsive to their needs."'' These groups

156See Rick Weiss, Bioethics Group Divided over Research on Mentally 111,
WASH.
PosT, Nov. 16, 1998, atA6.
157See Mayerson, supranote 155.
58
1Id.
159 d
16°See What Is People First(visited Jan. 11,2000) <http://www.open.org/-peoplel
/whatis.htm> (describing People First as "developmentally disabled people joining together to
learn how
to speak for ourselves").
161ROBERT M. LEVY AND LEONARD S.RUBENsTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL
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have undertaken noticeable efforts to influence legislative and
regulatory policies regarding their care and treatment

62

The Law on TreatmentRefusal
Concurrently, courts began to change their views, questioning the
"paternalistic" approach of institutions and recognizing the autonomy

interests of patients.163 Prior to the 1970s, courts, for the most part,
deferred to institutional authorities in the care, treatment, and custody
of institutionalized mental patients." In 1972, with the federal court

case of Wyatt v. Stickney, 65 courts started to recognize some rights of
institutionalized patients. While the court ruled that institutionalized
mentally ill patients had "a right to be free from unnecessary or
excessive medication," the court did not recognize their right to refuse

medication.'66 Yet, regarding research, the court stated, "[p]atients
shall have a right not to be subjected to experimental research without
the express and informed consent of the patient if the patient is able to
give such consent, and of his guardian or next of kin, after opportunities
DiA~uxrms 5 (1996). According to one source, membership in statewide self-advocacy
groups for the mentally retarded has grown rapidly with over 1,000 such groups in e:dcstenca
today - a threefold increase from 1990. See THE STATE OF THE STATEs mnD oRZ.iMTAL
DisAnuxrms 13-14 (David Braddock et al. eds., 5th ed.1998). The National Alliance for the
Mentally Ill, a grassroots, self-help and family organization dedicated to improving the lives of
people with severe mental illnesses, was founded in 1979. See National Alliance for thc
Mentally 1ll (visited Jan. 2, 2000) <http'//vvw.nami.orglabout/t'ventyrs.html>.
162
In the early 1990s over 800 self advocacy groups joined together to establikh a
national organization called Self Advocates Becoming Empowered (SABE). The group has
developed "an advocacy agenda calling for the phase-down and closure of all state operated"
institutions for the developmentally disabled in the U.S. THE STATE OF TiE STATES I
DEVELOPmENTAL DisAmarrIs supra note 161, at 14. See also SABE U4 s Online Directory

(visited Jan. 22,2000) <http:J/www.sabeusa.org> (describing organization).
163
See Dennis E. Cichon, The Right to "JustSay No." A History and Analysis of th2
Right to Refiuse Antipsychotic Drugs, 53 LA. L. REv. 283, 286 (1992).
1
rSee id This approach contrasted markedly with court decisions affining the right of
non-institutionalized individuals to make decisions about their care and treatment While the
requirement for informed consent, for example, was already adopted by the courts for most
individuals, it was not required for individuals in mental hospitals. See also PAUL S.
APPELBAUM, AiOST A REVOLUTION: MENrAL HELTH LAW Aim THE Lum.Ts OF CmAum 118
(1994) (discussing informed consent).
"65
See Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
' 651d at 400.
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for consultation with independent specialists and with legal
counsel .... 2,167
In 1978 and 1979, federal district courts in New Jersey 68 and
Massachusetts 169 issued opinions concluding that involuntarily

committed mental patients had a legal right to refuse antipsychotic
drugs.17 While courts have differed in their approaches to these cases
and the rationale supporting their determination, most courts have now

recognized a right to refuse 7medication and other therapies by
institutionalized mental patients.1 '
The Law on Civil Commitment
The move away from paternalism and toward autonomy is further
reflected in changes in civil commitment laws. Specifically, the basis
for civil commitment shifted from the need to treat to the need to

confine those deemed a danger to themselves or others.' This policy
7
shift was in large part the result of the holding in Lessard v. Schmidt, 1
a 1972 federal court decision. In Lessard,a federal district court held

that "the state must bear the burden of proving that there is an extreme
167Id

16gSee Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D. N.J. 1979), stay grantedby 481 F. Supp
552 (D. N.J. 1979), vacateden banc, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded,458
U.S. 1119
(1982), opinion on remand,720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983) (en banc).
169See Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), afd in part,rev'd In part,
634 F.2d
650 (Ist Cir. 1980), vacatedsub nom.
170
See Cichon, supranote 163, at 286.
'7tSee id (stating that courts have differed on the right's legal source and, in particular,
on the procedural safeguards necessary to protect the right). Historically, state courts were
quicker to recognize the right of a mentally ill patient to refuse medication than the federal
courts. From 1980 to 1990, federal courts that addressed the issue, adopted a professional
judgment standard under which "patients could not refuse medication unless the decision to
administer drugs constituted a substantial departure from accepted judgment, practices or
standards." William M. Brooks, Reevaluating Substantive Due Process As a Source of
Protectionfor PsychiatricPatients to Refuse Drugs, 31 ILW. L. REV. 937, 939 (1998). Since
1990, however, the Supreme Court has heard two cases involving a psychiatric patient's right
to refuse medication while in prison or while pending trial. In these cases, the Court appears to
have embraced a "broader reading of the right to refuse" treatment under the federal
Constitution. Id at 940.
'7See Lessard v. Schmidt 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
ID3See id at 1078.
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likelihood that if the person is not confined he will do immediate harm
to himself or others."174 In addition to defining dangerousness
narrowly, the Lessard court called for greater due process safeguards in
the commitment process."' These requirements included representation by counsel, adequate notice of charges justifying detention,
attendance at the hearing, exclusion of hearsay evidence, the privilege
against self-incrimination, and a standard of proof beyond a reasonable
76
doubt.

1

By the end of the 1970s, all states had commitment laws that
resembled the substance of the Lessard decision." These statutes
either restricted commitment to persons who were dangerous to
themselves or others (defining dangerousness to include "grave
disability" as well), or were interpreted as already providing these
requirements so as to remain constitutionally valid. 178 These changes
were not without controversy. According to some critics, these laws
made it nearly impossible to commit patients involuntarily.'
One
author stated that "a patient must literally be slashing his wrists or
brandishing a weapon before he can be held in a hospital.""'
Opposition to this view stems in large part from a concern for civil
liberties.' Advocates for the mentally Ml are sharply divided on the
issue: "[w]hile parent advocacy groups want to change the rules on
involuntary commitment, patient groups want to keep the policy strict,"
that is, continue to make it difficult to institutionalize the mentally il
against their will.' 2
174See id at 1093.
7
'See ia
17
6See id
177See APELAU

, supra note 164, at 28.

"'See id
179See Erica E. Goode, When Mental Illness Hits Home, U.S. NEWS & WORw Ri., Apr.

24, 1989, at 54.
SOd

"8t See White, supranote 132, at 201.
182M In response, it appears, to concerns of parent advocacy groups, the r"trictive
standards of some states have been relaxed. Since the late 1970's, some states have ex.panded
their restrictions for commitment beyond the justification of an immediate likelihood of harm
to self or others. See APPELBAUM, supranote 164, at 49. In 1979, a Washington State statute
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The Law on Guardianship and Advance Care Planning
Another example of the law's movement to afford those with decisional
incapacities more autonomy involves the effort to limit the scope of
state court guardianship orders. 83 A 1976 Washington statute
mandated that courts impose only such "specific limitations and
disabilities on a disabled person to be placed under a limited
guardianship as the court finds necessary for such person's protection
and assistance."'" Under this standard, persons "institutionalized as

mentally infirm.. .retain the right to consent or refuse to consent to
research absent specific evidence concerning inability to exercise that

right."

185

The limited guardianship movement was largely supported by

developments in thinking about decisional incapacity and its ties to
functional ability.1 6 Capacity, it was recognized, was not an all or
nothing issue, rather capacity is nuanced, with different levels of
capacity required for different tasks." 7 While courts do not consistently

write limited guardianship orders, a significant majority of "state
legislatures have taken major strides in recognizing the need for and
88
appropriateness of limited orders."'

redefined grave disability to include "severe deterioration in routine functioning" of a person's
physical and mental condition. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.05.020(1) (1995). Also, a North
Carolina statute broadened the definition of danger to self to include behavior that is grossly
irrational, inappropriate, or a sign of severely impaired judgment, creating a presumption that
patients cannot care for themselves. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.2 (1995). In addition, several
states have expanded their commitment criteria, facilitating hospitalization of certain classes of
mentally ill persons. See APPEAuM, supranote 164, at 49. These states are Alaska, Arizona,
Colorado, Hawaii, Kansas, Rhode Island, and Texas. See id.
'83See Sally Balch Hurme, Current Trends in GuardianshipReform, 7 MD. J. CONTENMP.
L. IssuEs 143, 145 (1995-1996).
184Protection of Human Subjects, Research Involving Those Institutionalized As
Mentally Infirm, Reports and Recommendations for Public Comment, 43 Fed. Reg. 11,327,
11,348 (Mar. 17, 1978) (quoting WASH. REv. CODEANN. § 11.88.010 (2) (Supp. 1976)).
ISS
1 d
186See Hurme, supra note 183, at 157-161.
187
See Peter V. Rabins, Issues Raised by Research Using Persons Suffering from
Dementia Who Have ImpairedDecisional Capacity, 1 J.HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 22, 23-25
(1998).
188See Sally Balch Hurme, Limited Guardianship:Its Implementation Is Long Overdue,
28 CLEARINGHOUSE REvIEW 660, 663 (1994).
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Paralleling the adoption of "limited guardianship" provisions has
been the establishment of guidelines for the execution of advance
directives. Today, all states have statutory regulations regarding some
type of advance directive (living willsS9 and durable powers of attorney
(DPA) for health care.)19 These documents allow individuals, while

competent, to express their wishes for medical treatment should they
become decisionally incapacitated, especially concerning lifeprolonging medical treatment.' While virtually all states had enacted
living will laws by the early 1980s, practitioners (both physicians and

health law attorneys) soon realized that there were significant
limitations to the static nature of living wills,19 2 and advocated, instead,

that individuals execute a DPA in which they could name a trusted
family member or friend to make medical treatment decisions on their
behalf should they become incapacitated. 93 In these documents,
patients might also express their wishes for medical treatment
according to a number of hypothetical medical scenarios."'

IS9Living wills are written expressions of an individual's wishes regarding receipt of
medical treatment if they should become terminally ill and medically incapacitated. Sce
Wmu
J. CutRANETAL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND EhImcs 637 (5th ed. 1998).
19'A recent survey of advance directive legislation of all fifty states and the District of
Columbia found that, as of July 1999, 48 states have living will statute. Se ABA
Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly, Health Care Surrogate Dccision-Making
Legislation (visited Apr. 18, 2000) <http'J/www.abanetorgelderlyhealth.html>.
The
exceptions are Massachusetts and Michigan. Of these states, 16 have a combined advance
directive statute merging DPA's for health care and living wills. See id. Theze states are
Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Virginia. All 50
states and the District have some type of health care DPA statute, whether it be contained in a
combined statute or only within a living will statute. See id Eleven state- currently have
special mental health advance directive statutes. These states are Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming. See id
19tSee NoIiMAN L. CANTOR, ADVANCE DiECIVEs ANM THE runsurr OF DEATH wi
DIGNrIy 23-24 (1993).
1
92See id. at 35 (describing the statutory constraints contained in living-will type laws).
193
See BARRY P. FuRnow Er. AL., HEALTH LAW 715 (1995) (stating that "[iln the early
1990s, the durable power of attorney quickly became the preferred form of advance directive").
'4See Diane E. Hoffmann, Sheryl Itkin Zimmerman & Catherine J. Tompkins, The
DangersofDirectives or FalseSecurity ofFormrs, 24 J. OFLAW, MED. & ETmIcs 5, 6 (1996).
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Advance directives have also been developed as a tool for choice

in psychiatric treatment and research participation. The Bazelon Center
for Mental Health Law, for. example, offers a "Psychiatric Advance
Directive" that allows for both the designation of a proxy and

"instructions about hospitalization and alternatives to hospitalization,
medications, electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), emergency interventions
(including seclusion, restraint and medication) and experimental studies
or drug trials."' 95 Commentators have also analyzed the circumstances
under which advance directives of this kind might be used.l 6
Moreover, advance directives (specifically, DPA) have been used by
subjects in dementia research at the Clinical Center of the National
Institutes of Health'97 and are included in the more recent proposals to
regulate research with the decisionally impaired. 9 '
Proxy Decision Making
At the same time that legislatures were passing laws authorizing the
implementation of advance directives, in furtherance of the autonomy

interest of people who wished to anticipate future periods of incapacity,
it became clear that many individuals were disinclined to execute these
documents.'99
Other mechanisms were needed to allow for

195See Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Inc., PsychiatricAdvance
Directive (visited January 10, 2000) <http:/vww.bazelon.orgladvdir.html>.
196See Patricia Backlar, Anticipatory Planning for Research Participants with
PsychiatricDisordersLike Schizophrenia,4 PsYCH., PUB. POL'Y & L. 829 (1998).
19
7See Alison Wichman, Protecting Vulnerable Research Subjects: PracticalReality of
Institutional Review Board Review and Approval, I J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 88, 95-97
(1998). Advance directives for research purposes, however, have the same weaknesses as
advance directives for clinical purposes. Instructional advance directives, in particular, often
fail to provide useful guidance for clinical care. See, e.g., Joan M. Teno et al., Do Advance
Directives Provide Instructions That Direct Care?, 45 J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc. 508 (1997);
Joanne Lynn, Why IDon 't Have a Living Will, 19 L., MED. & HEALTH CARE 101 (1991). With
regard to proxy advance directives, the proxy's decisions may not correspond to what the
individual would want done. See, e.g., Daniel P. Sulmasy et al., The Accuracy of Substituted
Judgments in Patientswith TerminalDiagnoses, 128 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 621 (1998); J.
SuhI et al., The Myth of Substituted Judgment: Surrogate Decision Making Regarding Life
Support Is Unreliable, 154 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 90 (1994).
198See infra note 242 and accompanying text.
199See FURROW, supra note 193 at 715.
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decisionmaking regarding end-of-life care for individuals lacking
decisional capacity. As a result, many states passed new laws or
expanded existing surrogate consent laws2 allowing family members,
and, in some cases, close friends of a patient, to make medical
treatment decisions for an individual lacking decisional capacity.'P
By 1999, thirty-seven states had passed surrogate health care
consent statutes.0 2 In many states devoid of such statutes, courts
articulated approval of surrogate consent.20 3 In both court decisions and
statutes, the surrogate was expected to decide consistent with the
patient's preferences and values (if known), or if not known, then
consistent with what would be in the patient's best interest'
This
movement was facilitated by a presumption that family members are
trustworthy and are better able to make these types of decisions for
patients than are the courts.0 ' This was particularly true in the area of
end of life decisionmaking. While state legislatures and state courts
recognized the authority of surrogates (agents and family members) to
consent to an incapacitated person's receipt of medical treatment, for
the most part they did not address consent to participation in
research.2 Yet, the legal recognition of family decisionmakers in the
realm of clinical decisionmaking paved the way for families to have a
voice in the research context.

ZO3These existing laws typically allowed a family member to consent to medical

treatment for another but not to refuse life sustaining treatment. Sce, e.g., MD. CODE AIN.,
HEALTH GEN. I § 20-107 (1993), repealedby Acts 1993, ch. 372, § I (effective Oct. 1, 1993).
2

0'Typically, these surrogate consent statutes listed, in order of priority, wVho could make

these various decisions, see, e.g., Virginia's Health Care Decisions Act, Al) guardian or

committee; 2) patient's spouse; 3) adult child of patient; 4) parent of patient, 5) adult brother or
sister of patient, or 6) any other relative of patient in descending order of blood relationship.
VA. STAT. § 54.1-2986 (A) (Michie 1998).
2

mSee Health Care Surrogate Decision-Malking Legislation (visited Jan. 11, 2000)

<http'//www.abanetorg/elderlyhealth.html>.
2
OSee FuRROW, supranote 193, at 718. See also New York State Task Force on Life
and the Law, WHEN OTHERS MUST CHOOSE: DECMnRG FOR PATIENTS WIroUr CAPACrY

(1992) 33-35 [hereinafter New York State Task Force].
20
4See New York State Task Force, spra, note 204 at 35.
20
See id at 51.
20
6See Hoffmann & Schwartz, supranote 15, at 125.
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Advances in the Treatment and Diagnosis of
Mental Illness and Diseases of the Brain
Another historical factor shaping the current debate regarding the
regulation of research with the decisionally impaired is the progress
that has been made in the treatment and diagnosis of mental illness and
diseases of the brain. Twenty-five years ago, when the Commission's
recommendations were first published, there had not been long-term
experience with antipsychotics and other drugs for the treatment of
mental illness, and the psychiatric research and treatment community
was somewhat divided between those advocating psychotherapy and
those advocating pharmacotherapeutic agents." 7 Today, drug therapy
is the primary approach to treatment of individuals with serious
psychiatric illness.0 ' There appears to be a consensus now that
"[p]sychoanalysis and its derivatives.. .have not proved to be effective
as primary treatment for serious psychiatric illness (e.g., schizophrenia
and manic-depressive illness)."2 9
That view, along with the
development of effective medications for the treatment of these
disorders, "led to a quiet revolution within American psychiatry and a
return to its medical roots.""21
While the
development of psychotropic
medications
revolutionized psychiatry and led to deinstitutionalization in the 1970's,
many of the most promising breakthroughs in drug treatment have been
relatively recent.211 In the last decade a number of new drugs for the
treatment of schizophrenia-including, risperidone, olanzipine and
207

See Sheldon H. Preskom, Mental Disorders Are Medical Diseases, in MENTAL
ILLNESS: OPPOSING VmIPonTS 29 (William Barbour, ed. 1995).
20
S5ee id
2 10

1d This revised understanding about the methods of psychiatric care evolved "over a
period from the late 1960s to the 1980s. During those years, psychiatry changed more
fundamentally than did any other area of medicine." Id. at 34.
21
'See E. Fuller Torrey, Mental Disordersare Medical Diseases, in MENTAL ILLNESS:
OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 264, 269 (William Barbour, ed. 1995). In the late 1970s and eighties
there was a hiatus in new drug developments for treatment of mental illness. See id. The lack
of developments in this area may have been due in part to the lack of research money given to
NIMH. See id According to one author, "by 1985 the federal government was spending the

same amount of research money on schizophrenia as it was on tooth decay." Id.
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quetiapine-all with many fewer side effects than the prior generation
of drugs, were approved by the FDA.2 Newer drugs have also been
recently developed for the treatment of depression23
These
medications, known as selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs),
are used more extensively than the older "tricyclics."2 ' 4 The more
common use of the SSRIs has been attributed to "a less problematic
side effect profile in these drugs, their lack of toxicity when taken in
overdoses, and their ease of administration (once-a-day dosing)." 5 In
addition to these developments, the first two drugs for the treatment of
Alzheimer's disease were approved by the FDA within the last few
2 16
years.
While drug developments have received attention, probably the
most significant progress in psychiatric research during the past twenty
years has been our heightened neuroscientific understanding of the
brain."' The development of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and
positron emission tomography (PET) scans have enabled scientists to
actually observe the brain and have offered psychiatric researchers the
212

See Grayson Norquist & Steven E. Hyman, Advances in Understandingand Treating
Mental illness. ImpliationsforPolicy, HEALTHl AF., Sept. 1, 1999, at 3S. These new drugs,

referred to as "atypical antipsychotics" do not require weekly blood monitoring and are beter
able to treat "the negative symptoms of schizophrenia such as withdrawal from social
contacts." Id at 38-39. They are also significantly more expensive than the older drugs they
have begun to replace. See id at 40.
213

See id

214See id.

2t5

See id at 39.

216See Donepezil (Aricept) Drugfor Alzheimer's: Use, Side Egrcts, Interactions (visited
Jan. 11, 2000) <httpJ/wvw.virtualdrugstore.comialzheimerldonepezil.html>.
The fit,
Tacrine HCL (Cognex) was approved by the FDA and came on the market in 1993. The

second, donepezil HCL (Aricept), was approved in 1996. These drugs are not a cure or
complete treatment for Alzheimer's disease, but do delay the progression of the disease.
Donepezil (Aricept)DrugforAlzheimer's: Use, Side Effects, Interations(visited Jan. 11,2000)
<http://vww.virtualdrugstore.comalzheimer/donepezil.html>. See also Susan Cruzan, FDA
Announces Approval of TACRINE HYDROCHLORIDE (visited Jan. 11, 2000)

<http-/vwwv.fda.gov/bbstopies/NEWS/NEWO0434.html> (announcing the Food and Drug
Administration's approval of tacrine hydrochloride, the first drug approved specifically to treat
symptoms
of Alzheimer's disease).
21

7See Decade ofthe Brain Home Page (LibraryofCongress) (visited Jan. 2, 2000)
<http'i/www.lcweb.loc.govlloclbrain> ("In 1990, President Bush proclaimed the nineties the
decade of the brain").
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opportunity to test hypotheses that they were previously unable to
218
test.
These gains in psychiatric research and treatment have occurred in
large part because of the involvement of mentally ill individuals in that
research. In the debate over current efforts to regulate this research,
researchers believe such efforts may lead to sacrificing future gains in
understanding and treating mental illnesses and brain disorders.
REGULATORY POSSIBILITIES AND POLICY CAUTION:
THE LATE 1990s AND BEYOND
Recent Governmental Initiatives
Against this background of prior regulatory failure and an increasingly
complex legal and medical environment, the recent state and federal
governmental initiatives to more stringently regulate research with the
decisionally impaired, reflect a noteworthy insistence that the
protection of these vulnerable subjects requires a renewed effort to find
a policy solution." 9 Within a six-month span in 1998, a Maryland
working group, convened by the Maryland Attorney General,
recommended state legislation on research involving "decisionally
incapacitated subjects;" ' a New York advisory work group, convened
by the New York Commissioner of Health, recommended regulations
on research involving "protected classes," including adults who either
lack or are likely to lose decisional capacity;"1 and the NBAC, created
by President Clinton in 1995, issued a lengthy report and policy

218

See Norquist & Hyman, supra note 212, at 36.
2191n addition to the three initiatives discussed in the text, the National Institutes of
Health has developed what it terms "points to consider," which it has posted on its web site "to
assist IRBs and clinical investigators in their effort to protect participants who are, or may be,
or may become decisionally impaired." National Institutes of Health, Interim - Research
Involving Individuals with Questionable Capacity to Consent: Points to Consider (visited Dec.
23, 1999) <http://grants.nih.gov/grantspolicy/questionablecapacity.htm>.
"'MARYLAND REPORT, supranote 1, at 1.
221NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 1, at 28-33.
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recommendations on research involving "persons with mental disorders
tn
that may affect decisionmaking capacity."
Of these three initiatives, only New York's effort was the result of
litigation. In T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Healtht 3
plaintiffs-consisting of patients involuntarily hospitalized at various
New York State psychiatric facilities who had been adjudicated
incapable of consenting to medical treatment-challenged regulations
promulgated by the Office of Mental Health? 4 The plaintiffs alleged
that, under the regulations, they could be forced to participate in
research without their consent?'m The regulations were struck down at
the trial court level because they were not consistent with a state statute
requiring the Commissioner of Health to consent to all research
involving children and incompetent adults?2 6
On appeal, the appellate court upheld the trial court decision, and
further deemed the regulations invalid based on additional statutory,
common law, and constitutional grounds. 7 The appellate court
decision raised concern among researchers nationwide who feared they
might be prevented from conducting scientifically valuable research on
the psychiatric populationmt ' However, New York's highest court,
while upholding the lower court decisions, ruled that, in declaring the

2

nNBAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.

2mSee T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 626 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (Sup. Ct.
1995) aftd, 650 N.Y.S.2d 173 (App. Div. 1996), appeal dismissed, 6S0 N.E2d 617 (N.Y.

1997), leave to appealgranted, 684 N.E.2d 281 (N.Y. 1997), appeal dismissed 668 N.Y.S.2d.
153 (N.Y. 1997).
22 4

' See T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 1017.

2Ssee id
226See id at 1021.
nmSee T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 183. See also
Hoffmann & Schwartz, supranote 15, at 129 (noting that based on the appellate court decision,
residents in aNew York state facility operated or licensed by the Office of Mental Health who

lack decision-making capacity [could] not be subjects in any (non federally funded) r.-zearch
determined to be "non therapeutic" and to pose a greater than minimal risk unlec3 the
individual (prior to incapacity) gave "specific consent or designated a suitable surrogate from
whom such consent" could be obtained).
8
2"
See Hoffinann & Schwartz, supra note 15, at 129.

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol. 3:547

regulations invalid on additional grounds, the appellate court had issued
"an inappropriate advisory opinion." 9
As a result of the trial court's original ruling, however, a
regulatory vacuum existed, and the Commissioner of Health could
hardly fill it without first obtaining expert advice about the relevant
ethical and policy issues." ° The other two efforts, however, were
entirely discretionary. The Maryland Attorney General perceived a
problem-a gap in both federal and state law concerning proxy consent
for research participation-and sought to develop a consensus on how
to address it.23
NBAC chose the issue of research involving
decisionally impaired subjects as a topic for its first report on nongenetic human subjects research.23 Thus, the Maryland and NBAC
initiatives, in particular, suggest that at least some in the policy arena
believe that the conduct of research with impaired-capacity subjects is a
problem, not simply a condition. The distinction is important for the
development of public policy----"[f]or a condition to be a problem,
people must become convinced that something should be done to
233
change it."
A belief that something should be done, however, is but the first
step and does not necessarily imply agreement about the nature of the
remedial action. Among the three governmental initiatives, one finds
broadly similar recommendations in a number of areas as well as areas
of disagreement.234 All three initiatives adopted similar frameworks in
22'9See T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 668 N.Y.S.2d. 153, 154 (N.Y.
1997).
23°See id. at 185 (noting that the Commissioner of Health would likely issue new
regulations governing human subjects research in response to the court's invalidation of the

regulations).
23'See Hoffmann & Schwartz, supra note 15, at 134. In light of uncertainty about the
authority of agents and surrogates to consent to participation in research on behalf of
decisionally impaired individuals, as well as the strong and differing views expressed by some

researchers and advocates, the Maryland Attorney General's Offices established what was
called a "Working Group" to begin a dialogue on the issue. Id.
232See Exec. Order No. 12,975, 60 Fed. Reg. 52,063, 52065 (1995) ("[As a] first
priority" the NBAC was to assess the "protection of the rights and welfare of human research
subjects").
233j. W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIFs 114 (1995).
234Because it is a federal entity, NBAC addressed some matters-for example,
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their regulatory approach. Research on this population was first divided
into two categories: research affording the prospect of direct medical
benefits to participants and research without this prospectO' Research
was also categorized according to level of risk.
Although proxy
decisionmakers are given authority to enroll those lacking capacity in
research, more protections are required, and greater restrictions on
proxy decisionmakers are imposed, if research has no prospect of direct
medical benefit or poses more than minimal risk. 7 Many points
emphasized are substantively similar to points emphasized in the earlier
regulatory efforts by DHEW. These include:
" Need for research with this population. Researchers
should not recruit subjects with impaired capacity if the
research could be done with other subjects."
* Justificationof researchdesign. Researchers should be
expected to pay especially careful attention to the riskbenefit profile of research involving these subjects?"'
" Informed consent. Individuals with psychiatric or other
disorders potentially affecting their decision-making
capacity are not, for that reason alone, disqualified
from giving informed consent for research

membership on an IRB by individuals who can represent the subject population-that were
thought by Maryland and New York to be beyond the scope of a state effort. The omLision of
these matters from the Maryland and New York reports does not nce=-arily imply

disagreement with NBAC.
235See Hoffnann & Schwartz, supra note 15, at 137-38.
236
See id at 139.
237See id at 139-49 (discussing Working Group's consideration of five factual scenarios
concerning research protocols with different levels of risk and potential benefits).
238See NBAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 10; NEwv YORK REPORT, supra note 1, at 30;
MARYLAND REPORT, supranote 1, at 3, A8-A9.
29See NBAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 10; NEw YORK REPORT, supra note 1, at 30-31;
MARYLAND REPORT, supranote

1, at 3, A13-A16.
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participation. Researchers should pay careful attention
to capacity assessment. 240
* Assent and objection. Potential research subjects who
are incapable of giving informed consent but who are
capable of giving assent-that is, explicit, albeit not
informed, permission-for research participation
should be asked for assent. Individuals should not be
compelled to participate in research over their
objection.241
Newer provisions, not included in earlier regulatory drafts, but common
to all three recent proposals include:
" Advance planning for research. Individuals with
present capacity who can anticipate future incapacity
(for example, people with early Alzheimer's disease)
should be able to express their wishes about future
research participation. They should also be allowed to
pick their own "legally authorized representatives."
The exact effect of planning documents, however, was
one area of disagreement among the three
governmental efforts.242
* Research involving the prospect of direct medical
benefit or involving no greater than minimal risk.
Family members or others who may authorize clinical
care for an incapacitated patient should be permitted to
authorize participation in these categories of research.243
240

See NBAC

REPORT,

supra note 1, at 57-58; NEw YORK REPORT, supra note 1, at 32;

MARYLAND REPORT, supranote

1, at 3, A9-A1 1.
See NBAC REPORT, supranote 1, at 57-58; NEw YORK REPORT, supra note 1, at 32;

24t

MARYLAND REPORT, supranote 1, at 3, A21-A23.
242
See NBAC REPORT, supranote 212, at 61; MARYLAND REPORT, supra note 210, at 3.
243

See NBAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 53-54. Earlier proposals for research with
institutionalized individuals, including the National Commission Report, did not include
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Areas of disagreement among the three proposals include:

" Characterizationof the subject population. To the
dismay of many commentators, NBAC focused its
analysis on "persons with mental disorders that may
affect decisionmaking capacity." 2' Maryland and New
York considered that decisional incapacity itself,

regardless of its clinical origin, was the key factor in
identifying a class of vulnerable subjects. 245
" Independent capacity assessment. According to
NBAC, when research involves greater than minimal
risk, a professional who is independent of the research

team should assess the potential subjects' capacity to
consent, unless "there are good reasons" for using a less

formal procedure. 246 Neither Maryland nor New York
would mandate this kind of independent capacity
assessment 247

" Levels of risk andproxy authority. NBAC recognized

consent by a family member even at this level of risk. Patient assent or lack of objection was
required. If a patient objected to participation, additional protections were required. Scc supra
note 229 and accompanying text; MARYLAND REPORT, supra note 1, at 4; NEW YORK REPORT,
supranote 1, at 26-27.
244
See NBAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. NBAC acknowledged that "[p]ersons with
mental disorders are not...unique in being at risk for loss of decisionmaking capacity." NBAC
REPORT, supra note 1, at 5. NBAC explained rather cryptically that it "principally focused its
attention on those who may be primarily considered for research protocols because it is their
particular mental disorder that is being studied." Id Taking NBAC to task for retaining its
"mental disorders" focus despite vehement objections during the public comment period, one
prominent psychiatrist accused NBAC of perpetuating "outmoded stereotypes." Robert
Michels, Are Research Ethics Badfor OurMental Health?, 340 NEW EG. L MED. 232, 142730 (1999).
245
5ee MARYLAND REPORT, supra note 1, at 3; NEwYORK REPORT, supranote 1, at 2.
246
5ee NBAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 58; This recommendation is similar to the
"consent auditor" recommendation of the National Commission. Sce supratext accompanying
notes 86
247and 94.
See MARYLAND REPORT, supra note 1, at 3; NEW YORK REORT, supranote I, at 30.
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only two levels of risk, minimal and greater than
minimal. In NBAC's view, when research presents
greater than minimal risk and no prospect of direct
medical benefit, a legally authorized representative
should have authority to agree to research participation
in an IRB-approved protocol only if the protocol were
also approved by a special federal review panel.2 41 This
approach, in the view of many commentators, would
present a formidable barrier to various types of research
involving, most significantly, brain imaging procedures
like MRI.249 These and similar procedures have been
viewed as falling into an intermediate risk category,
"minor increase over minimal risk."25 ° Both Maryland
and New York retained this intermediate risk category.
Maryland would allow only a relatively small subset of
legally authorized representatives (proxies named in
durable powers of attorney for health care) to agree to
an incapacitated subject's participation in this kind of
research. New York would allow a broader group of
legally authorized representatives (family members
acting as surrogates) to do so.
Aftermath of the Initiatives-Policymakers' Caution
Each of the three initiatives recommended policy action. NBAC
recommended amendments to the federal regulations governing
research on human subjects, the New York task force recommended
new Health Department regulations, and the Maryland working group
248

See NBAC

REPORT,

supra note 1, at 54. The NBAC envisioned that, after acquiring

sufficient experience with protocol-by-protocol review, the federal panel would adopt
guidelines enabling IRB approval of certain types of greater-than-minimal-risk research. See

id.
249

See, e.g., Michels, supra note 244, at 1428 ("The NBAC considers the present system

for evaluating a patient's capacity to consent to dangerous treatment inadequate even to assess
the capacity to consent to MRI for research purposes").
Z °This characterization of an intermediate level of risk is found in the Department of
Health and Human Services regulations governing research with children. See 45 C.F.R. §

46.406(a) (2000).
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recommended enactment of a statute.2s
However, none of the
recommendations has been implemented thus far.
Although the Secretary of Health and Human Services has taken
NBAC's report under advisement, no regulatory action seems likely in
the near future. Moreover, NBAC requested states "to confirm, by
statute or court decision" that proxies for clinical purposes have
authority to act as "legally authorized representatives" and that friends
as well as relatives be able to serve in this capacity. - NBAC also
requested state legislatures to ensure that "persons who choose to plan
for future research participation are entitled to choose" their research
proxies."
No state legislature has yet acted on these
recommendations.
Action pursuant to the New York recommendations has been
delayed in part by the resignation of the former Commissioner of
Health and appointment of a successor, who would naturally require
time to familiarize herself with the issues. Action has also been
delayed because the recommendations produced sharp criticism from
both advocates and researchers.'
A series of articles that appeared in
the New York Post on the task force recommendations in early 1999
provide some insights into the politics of the situation.P" According to
one article, John Cardinal O'Connor, "evoking Nazi Germany,
warned.. .that the recommendations were dangerous" and "[a]dvocates
for the mentally ill vowed to go to court if necessary to block them."'
A subsequent article stated that "hundreds of advocates for the mentally
ill protested at the Capitol" against what they viewed as
recommendations supporting "state-sponsored drug experiments using

25'See NBAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 53; MARYLAND REPORT, supra note 1, at 2; Nmv
YoRK REPORT, supra note 1, at 29.

2S2See NBAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 52.
2S3See id at 52-53.
2"4See Gregg Bimbaum, Gov Says He s All Ears in Drug-TestingFuror,N.Y. PosT, Jan.
20, 1999, at 12.
2SSSee infranotes 256-260.
2s5 See Gregg Birnbaum, O'ConnorBoosts Drug-Test Protesters,N.Y. POST, Mar. 10,
1999, at 12.
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vulnerable people as 'human guinea pigs."' 7 The article further
recounted that Cardinal O'Connor, prior to a meeting on this issue with
Governor Pataki, said that "to allow experiments with some risk-and
no benefit to the subject-on adults who are too
ill to consent on their
258
own... could be a potentially horrifying thing.'
A short time later, an article appeared expressing the views of the
research and medical community.2 59 The article described how many of
the city's leading hospitals and medical schools were lobbying the state
to relax the proposed regulations and that they had "warned the state
Health Department that the regulations will stifle research and cause
drug companies to divert their funding to states that have less red
26
tape. 0
The Maryland Attorney General's effort to win passage of detailed
regulatory legislation collapsed after a divisive legislative hearing.26'
On the one hand, a representative of the pharmaceutical manufacturers
complained of the burdens that the proposal would place on
researchers, and academic medical centers lamented the additional
burden on IRBs. 262 On the other hand, the Maryland Catholic
Conference and various patient advocacy and disability rights groups
attacked the proposal as opening the door to exploitation of vulnerable
people.263 The legislators, appalled by the length and complexity of the

25

1d
25Gregg Birnbaum, Hosps Fightfor Freedom to Experiment, N.Y. POST, Mar. 24, 1999,
9

at 20.

26 0
1d
26

1See GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND FINAL STATUS REPORT OF PROPOSED

LEGISLATION (1999 Session) (reporting that SB 307 was reported out unfavorably by the
Judicial Proceedings Committee) [hereinafter GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND].
262
See testimony of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America in
Opposition to Maryland Senate Bill 307 (March 8, 1999) (on file with the authors). See also
testimony of David B. Mallot, M.D., Associate Professor of Psychiatry and Associate Dean for
Medical Education, University of Maryland, Baltimore (March 11, 1999) (on file with the
authors).
26
3See testimony of The Maryland Catholic Conference on Senate Bill 307 Presented
Thursday, March 11, 1999 by Richard J. Dowling; testimony of The Arc of Maryland in
opposition to SB 307 (March 11, 1999); testimony of Jamey George (for MCIL Resources for

20001

RESEARCH& DECISIONALLYIAPAIRED INDIVIDUALS

proposal and discomfited by the controversy, promptly voted to halt the
2
bill . 64

A More Complicated Context for Regulation
Today, as compared to twenty years ago, the context in which the
debate over regulation of research with the decisionally impaired takes
place is a much more complex one, with strong and cogent voices on
each side. Arguments for and against the need for this type of
regulation push and pull policymakers in opposite directions and make
significant regulatory change a slim possibility at present.
The Pullfor the Status Quo
Today, arguments of the potential for great breakthroughs in research
on psychiatric illnesses and diseases of the brain pull policy makers in
the direction of opposing more stringent regulation of research in this
area. With the relatively recent development of brain imagining
techniques, researchers are hoping to find "biological indicators" for
specific mental illnesses.2 65 In fact, "intensive efforts are under way to
find such markers based on abnormalities found in brain structure or
functioning for many mental disorders and on abnormalities in
cognitive testing. 1)266
These recent developments bolster researchers' contentions that
greater progress is imminent and regulations now will impede
breakthroughs that may result not only in treatment of many forms of
mental impairment but also in cures for these devastating illnesses. 67

Independent Living, Inc. in opposition to SB 307 (March 11, 1999); and Teztiomy Regarding
SB 307 by the Maryland Legislative Lobby for Life, Inc. (March 11, 1999) (on file with the
authors).
2

6See GENERALASSEiBLY OF MARYLAND, supranote 261.
See Norquist & Hyman, supra note 212, at 36.

265

2m6

2 7 See Robert Pear, Inspector Warns of Hazards in Experimental Drug Tests, TAE PLAIt

DEALER, May 30, 1998, at A8 (stating that "[s]cientists are reporting explosive growth in
promising new biomedical research, with hundreds of products being tested on tens of
thousands of patients, including children and people with severe mental illness'). Sec alro

See also Weiss, supranote 156, at A6 (quoting David Shore of the National Institute of Mental
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Some members of NBAC, in fact, argued that the NBAC proposals
went too far and would, in all likelihood, stifle important and needed
research.26
Another argument of those opposed to more regulation in research
is that researchers and IRBs are already adopting many of the
suggestions called for by the recent regulatory proposals. These critics
argue that, although there has been no change in this area since 1973 on
the federal level either legislatively or through regulation, some subtle
but recognizable changes are being made.
These changes are likely to be a response to the availability and
visibility of the proposals by the prestigious NBAC and the states of
Maryland and New York, but other factors may also be at play. For
example, researchers may fear additional litigation such as the T.D. v.
New York State Office of Mental Health case in New York, as well as
the revitalized enforcement efforts of NIH's Office of Protection from
Research Risks (OPRR) and the accompanying potential loss of
research dollars.1 9 As one prominent psychiatric researcher, Dr.

Health as saying,"[t]his is probably not the best time to put the brakes on...since the science is
now progressing
very fast and Congress has recently become generous with funds").
26
8See NBAC REPORT, supranote 1, at 85-86 (Bernard, Lo, dissenting)
jiThe Commission's recommendations.. .raise barriers to research that
involves only small increases over minimal risks and is likely to result
in important knowledge about the participant's disease. Hence, the
recommendations will thwart a better understanding of the
pathophysiology of the diseases that impair decisionmaking capacity,
while providing little additional protection to vulnerable subjects. This
is not the correct balance between protecting vulnerable persons and
developing better treatments for patients with brain disorders.
Id. See also Patricia Maldonado, PresidentialCommission Makes Recommendations to Protect
Mentally III,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 18, 1998, (reporting that, in a letter to the Commission, Dr.
Robert W. Buchanan of the Maryland Psychiatric Research Center, said "some of the
commission's recommendations "reinforce concerns' among researchers that the commission is
"antipsychiatric research").
269
See, e.g., Jeffrey Brainard, US. Suspends Human-Subjects Research at Virginia
Commonwealth U, CHRON. HIGH. ED., Jan. 28, 2000, at A34; Jeffrey Brainard & D.W. Miller,
Federal Regulators Suspend University Medical Studies in Pennsylvania and Alabama,
CHRON. HIGH. ED., Jan. 24, 2000; Jeffrey Brainard, Watchdog Agency Blocks New HumanResearch Projectsat U, ofIllinoisat Chicago,CHRON. HIGH. ED., Sept. 10, 1999, at A44;
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William Carpenter, recently commented, "Although I believe much of
the present public attention is ill-informed and unfair, the field has
received a wake-up call." He outlined several suggestions for
heightened subject protection that he said "have worked well" at his
research facility." ° These included soliciting patient comment on
proposed research and consent forms, including clinicians other than
research investigators in the capacity assessment and informed consent
process, conducting the informed consent process as a bona fide
"educational procedure" with special efforts to overcome the
"therapeutic misconception," and providing "educational and
sensitivity-raising sessions in ethics for investigators and staff."'
NIMH is also proposing the implementation of guidelines designed to
provide additional protections for decisionally impaired research
subjects.2'
Another example of incremental change in this area is direct
involvement by patient volunteers and advocates in IRBs.2 3 The
National Alliance for the Mentally Ill (NAMI) has initiated a program
to train and place NAMI members on IRBs across the country 4 With
the first group of NAMI trainees almost fully placed, and the NAMI
Program presented at a recent meeting of IRB members and
and other
administrators, 25 NAMI is receiving requests for trainees
27 6
advocacy groups are discussing training their members.

Paulette Walker Campbell, Government Suspends Most Human Research Projectsat Dzike U.,
CHRoN. IGH. ED., May 13, 1999, at 20.
270
See William T. Carpenter, Jr., The Challenge to Psychiatry as Society' Agent for
Mental27illness
Treatment andResearch, 156 Am . PSYCIL 1307 (1999).
1

' d. at 1309-10.

2

nSee David Shore & Steven E. Hyman, An NIMH Commentary on the NBAC Report,

46 BIowO=AL PsYcuxATRY 868, 1013-16 (1999).
2
73See NAMI Invests in Mental Health Research Subject Education, THE BLUE SHEET,

Nov. 11, 1998.
274
see id
27
5

See id

6

27See id
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The Pushfor More Stringent Regulation
On the other hand, the push for more stringent regulations gains
momentum with every new account of research abuses of vulnerable
persons depicted in the popular press. 277 These have not been limited to
research on the decisionally impaired but have included research with
racial minorities, the terminally ill, and other patients. For example,
only recently has the federal government unequivocally apologized for
the Tuskegee Syphilis study.27 In addition, a 1995 federal report
revealed ethical lapses in a number of studies involving radiation,
including some in which decisionally impaired subjects were
involved. 279
Recent press coverage has described questionable research
practices across a wide spectrum including research with individuals
who are mentally ill or have other decisional impairments.28 Some
articles have focused on conflicts of interest, in which physicians
pressure patients into enrolling in clinical trials so that the physicians
may receive the enrollment fee paid by the drug company testing their
product.281 Other articles have exposed physician researchers engaging
in fraudulent reporting of data in order to satisfy drug sponsors.282
These articles erode public trust in the research enterprise.
Generally, articles discussing research on the mentally impaired
have focused on a few controversial types of research. These include
washout and challenge studies.283 Washout studies require that
277See infra notes 278-82 and 293.
278

See Alison Mitchell, Clinton Regrets 'Clearly Racist' US. Study, N.Y. TmwsS, May

17,1997,
atAl, available in 1997 WL 17838570.
279
See Human Radiation Experiments: Roadmap to the Project:ACHRE Report (visited
Jan. 17, 2000) <http:www.tis.eh.doe.gov/ohre/roadmap/achre/report.html>.
'80See infra notes 291-294.
23
1See Kurt Eichenwald & Gina Kolata, Drug Trials Hide Conflicts for Doctors, N.Y.
Two, May 16, 1999, at Al (stating that SmithKline Beecham P.L.C., was paying $1,610 for
each patient that doctors signed up and that doctors can earn as much as $500,000 to $1 million

a year 282
for recruiting patients into clinical drug trials).
See Kurt Eichenwald & Gina Kolata, A Doctor'sDrugStudies Turn into Fraud, N.Y.
Tams, May 17, 1997, at Al (reporting on practices of Dr. Robert Fiddes who allegedly
became rich by "conducting research fraud of audacious proportions, cutting corners and
inventing data to keep the money flowing from the drug industry.")
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individuals be taken off their medication for a period of time.'P In
studies seeking an understanding of the physiology of mental illness,
scans are then taken of the brain to observe the natural course of the
disease and its impact on the brain.' Washout may also be necessary
to make sure an individual is cleansed of one drug before a new drug is
offered as part of a clinical trial.' Challenge studies also require that
Research subjects are
individuals be taken off their medications.'
given drugs that exacerbate symptoms or induce psychosis."3 These
"challenge agents" enable scientists to use the subjects as models for
studying psychotic illnesses.
Articles in the lay press have focused on the risks inherent in these
studies. In a number of cases, individuals were allegedly harmed and
were not given informed consent prior to enrollment in the studies.'
Reports that a schizophrenic patient who had participated in a washout
study committed suicide in 1991 by jumping off the roof of a building
at the University of California at Los AngelesP' were taken by critics as
damning evidence of the risks associated with this type of research? '
A series in the Boston Globe in November 1998 focused, in large part,
on patients who were enrolled in washout and challenge studies without
being told that they might experience relapses or be exposed to drugs

mSee infra note 293.
2"4NBAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 13-14. Sometimes these medication free periods are
referred to as "drug holidays." Id. at 14.

2s"See id
'2-See id at 14 ("[S]uch a protocol often seeks to return the individual to a medication
free baseline state so that behavior can be assessed or new drugs introduced without the

confounding factor of other substances already in the person's system").
28See id
mSee id
u'NBAC REPORT, supranote 1, at 13.

29See infra notes 291-93.
291See Philip J. Hilts, Agency Faults a UCLA Study for Sffering of Mental Patients,
N.Y. TIMs, Mar. 10, 1994, at Al (reporting that the OPRR found that the experiment "ailed

to comply with the requirements of H.H.S. regulations by not telling patients the extent of the
risks they would be asked to take and not telling them that ordinary treatment would be safer
for most of them").
mSee Editorial, When MentalPatientsAre at Risk,N.Y. TIms, Miar. 31, 1999, at A28.
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that would exacerbate their symptoms.293 An editorial appearing in the
Globe on the heels of the series characterized the articles as presenting
"an ethical wasteland where doctors not only cause anguishing
psychotic symptoms in formerly functioning patients, but occasionally
drive them to suicide."294 Individuals who bring forth this list of abuses
argue that, while regulation of research with this population is
necessary, the regulatory proposals do not go far enough.
Researchers defend this type of reseaich by arguing that the
conditions being studied are uniquely human conditions and there are
no animal models for developing treatment.295 Researchers further
contend that the risks of these studies have been exaggerated and that
adequate safeguards for subject welfare are in place. 296 The goal of
these studies, according to the NBAC, "is to generate disease
manifestations in a controlled setting so that they can be more fully
understood and so that appropriate interventions can be designed,
attempted, and evaluated."297 Yet, the NBAC Report raised several
questions about these studies including whether it is "possible to obtain
informed consent to participate in a study designed to provoke symptoms"
and "whether the relationship between risks and potential benefits can ever
justify enrolling individuals in such studies when the protocols include
intentionally inducing what would otherwise be considered harmful." 293
Those arguing for more stringent regulations express skepticism about
the ability of IRBs to protect research subjects. Rejecting arguments
that self improvement by IRBs is sufficient without additional
regulations, critics argue that there are deeper, more fundamental

293

See Robert Whitaker & Dolores Kong, Doing Harm: Research on The Mentally Ill,

BosToN GLOBE, Nov. 15-18, 1998, at Al (four-part series).
294See Editorial, UnethicalExperimentation, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 19, 1998, at A26.

295See Whitaker & Kong, supra note 293.
296See William T. Carpenter & Robert R. Conley, Sense and Nonsense: An Essay on
SchizophreniaResearchEthics, 35 SCH ZOPHRENIA RESEARCH 219, 222-23 (1999).
297/d See also Franklin G. Miller & Donald L. Rosenstein, Psychiatric SymptomProvoking Studies: An Ethical Appraisal, 42 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 403 (1997)

("Encouraging open discussion of potentially problematic psychiatric research coupled with
refinement of research guidelines may obviate excessive regulatory restrictions that could
hamper valuable research and its contribution to improved patient care").
29SSee NBAC REPORT, supranote 1, at 13-14.
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problems with the IRB system that these modifications do not
address.'
For example, a June 1998 report of the Department of
Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector General identified
deficiencies in IRB oversight and concluded that IRBs are under
considerable stress-faced with many more protocols for review than
they can adequately handle.3" Others have criticized IRBs as being
captives of the institutions over which they preside, heavily dominated
by researchers and others motivated by the cash flow that comes to
academic institutions from research grants,'31 with only a token member
from the community or representative of patient interests."2
The Politics of Change-Alliances and Divergences
Among Advocacy Groups for the
Mentally III and those with Dementia
The complexity of regulating research in this area is further
compounded by unexpected political alliances and rifts betveen
advocacy groups that, in other circumstances, would be regarded as
allies. New voices of patients, not heard twenty-five years ago;
differences in perspective based upon disease category; and diverging
interests between patients and family members have splintered
stakeholders that might otherwise be unified in their approach to this
303
issue.

299See Institutional Review Boards: A Time for Reform Before the House Resources
Subcomm.,
House Government Reform and Oversight Comm., 1OSth Cong. (1998).
3
0See Institutional Review Boards: A Time for Reform Before the House Resources
Subcomm., House Government Reform and Oversight Comm., 1OSth Cong. I (199S); NANII
INVESTs IN MENTAL HEALTH REsEARCH SuBJEcr EDUCATION, FRnL REPORT: EVALUATO

OF

NIH IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 491 OF THE PuBUC HEALTH SERvicE Acr, MA ATING A
OF PRoTcrIoN FOR RESEARCH SuBjEcrs I (1998).
PROGRAM
301
See Sundram, supra note 117, at 49-50 (referring to the 1996 GAO Report which

raised concerns about IRB "lack of independence, and collegial and institutional prs.-sures
upon IRB
members that cloud their role as a safeguard on research practices").
302
See Adil E. Shamoo & Joan L. O'Sullivan, The Ethics of Research on the Mentally
Disabled, in HEALTH CARE ETHICs--CRMCAL ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 242 (J.F.

Monagle
& D.C. Thomasma, eds.,1998).
30
3See Weiss, supra note 156, at A6 (stating that regulating psychiatric research "has
even split the vociferous community of patient advocates, including the 185,000-member
National Alliance for the Mentally Ill (NAMI). One camp perceives research as the key to
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Patient advocacy groups have been the strongest proponents of
research with decisionally impaired, even research that requires the
involvement of persons unable to provide their own informed consent
Advocacy groups representing Alzheimer's disease patients have long
been supporters of research, actively entering into partnership with
researchers to assist in study advertisement and recruitment.3

Advocates for psychiatric patients, particularly NAMI, have also been
strong supporters of research." 5 Yet many factors have contributed to
differences of opinion between these two patient groups regarding the

regulation of research with those lacking decisionmaking capacity,
including differences in disease manifestation and sequelae.
Specifically, Alzheimer's disease is a late-onset disorder.3" Although
there are subsets of the disorder that present in middle life, the

overwhelming majority of cases surface at the end of the life span. 0 7
Because of this fact, persons who suffer from Alzheimer's disease are
likely to remain in the care of their extended families from whom they

curing mental illness and wants to assure that new regulations are not unduly restrictive. The
other camp sees its former colleagues as having sold out to wealthy pharmaceutical companies
and private research enterprises, which in recent years have sought to integrate themselves into
the patient advocacy movemenf).
304In 1982, the Alzheimer's Association initiated its own grants program and since then
"has awarded $60 million in research funding." The Association "has a long commitment to
the direct support of research grants as well as a commitment, through public policy efforts, to
increase federal funding for Alzheimer's disease research. See Alzheimer's Association
(visited Jan. 24, 2000) <http://www.alz.org.>. See also Local Opportunities for Participation
in Research (visited Jan. 24, 2000) <http://www.alzcmd.org> (Maryland Chapter of the
Alzheimer's Association website listing local clinical trials and other research opportunities for
Alzheimer's
patients.)
305
See Senate Bill 307, Before the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, (Mar. 11,
1999) (testimony of Bill O'Brien, Chair of the NAMI Maryland Subcommittee on Research
Ethics). See also Laurie M. Flynn & Ronald S. Honberg, Achieving Proper Balance In
Research with DecisionallyImpaired Subjects: NAMI's Perspective on the Working Group's
Proposal, I J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 174, fn 50 (1998) (describing NAMI standards
established for the protection of research subjects). But see Weiss, supra note 303, at A6
(describing
the schism between members of NAMI over this issue).
3
°6See Eleanor P. Lavretsky & Lissy F. Jarvik, Etiology and PathogenesisofAlzhelmer's
Disease: Current Concepts, in ALZHEImER'S DISEASE: A HANDBOOK FOR CAREGIVERs 80
(Ronald C. Hamdy et al. eds., 2d ed. 1994)
'0See id (' The prevalence of dementia from all causes, ranges from 5%to 10% among
persons age 65 and older and the rate increases exponentially as age advances").
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can draw much support and sympathy."' In contrast, psychiatric illness

tends to strike much earlier in life, leaving many persons with
psychiatric illness unable to finish school, start or sustain careers, or
establish their own families?'° Unlike Alzheimer's disease patients

who have had a chance to contribute to society and raise a family, it is
not uncommon for persons with psychiatric disease to have caused
much burden and heartache for their families for many years?"° Much
more so than in the Alzheimer's context, a split exists between persons
with mental illness and their family members regarding research on this

population and how it should be regulated"

As might be expected,

relatives of individuals with a psychiatric disease are largely supportive

of regulations that allow for family consent to participation in research
of a patient lacking decisional capacity"
Some individuals with
mental illness, however, fear that they might, all too quickly, be tagged

as decisionally impaired and enrolled, by a member of their family, in a
clinical trial in which they would not wish to participate

3

The

division is analogous to the debate over the laws for civil
commitment-family members of the mentally ill would like to see the
laws loosened to allow more flexibility in committing mentally ill
3

'ssee Curtis B. Clark & Lynda Westerly, Elder Abuse, in ALzEMmL's DmsEAm. A

HArmOOK FOR CAREmG

, 329 (Ronald C. Hamdy et al. eds., 2d ed. 1999).
309See Laura Lee Hall & Laurie Flynn, Consumer andfamily concerns about research
involving human subjects research, in ETMCS INPSYCHIAMIC REARF-tCtH 219-38 (Harold Alan
Pincis et al. eds., 1999).
3'see
idL
31
'See id
312
See id
313
Amici in the T.D. case criticized the New York regulations on recearch with
institutionalized patients as allowing surrogates to consent to such participation without
guidelines that require them to consider what the patient would have wanted or what would be
in their best interest and argued that "without proper guidelines, surrogates may be influenced,
however, subconsciously, by such improper considerations as the perception that the patient's
continued care is dependent on participation in research, or desperation for a cure even when
the research is non therapeutic." Brief for proposed Amici Curiae, The Bazelon Center for
Mental Health Law, et al. T.D. v. New York State OFIce ofMental Health, 650 N.Y.S2d 173
(App. Div. 1996)(No. 5136191). See also Richard Ketai et al., Family Influence in the
Recruitment of Schizophrenic Research Subjects, 138 AM. L PSYCIUATRY 351 (1981) (finding
"striking manipulation" by family members to have their schizophrenic relatives participate in
high risk research).
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patients so that they can be treated; mentally ill patients prefer the
narrow criteria of "dangerousness" to remain the commitment
14
standard.
Another difference in disease manifestation has contributed to
differences in the political force of each of these groups. Alzheimer's
disease is a disease of the modem age. It has only been in the twentieth
century that persons have lived long enough to develop the disorder.
Psychiatric disease, in contrast, has been observed and recorded
throughout all of human history. These differences, in part, contribute
to the differentials in social stigma associated with these diseases.
Although we now know that the loss of our mental faculties in late life
is not normal aging but a manifestation of brain disease, we still tend to
feel more kindly to our elderly neighbor when we find him or her
wandering, disoriented and confused, than we do towards the young
schizophrenic who gets on the subway with us, talking to him or herself
and gesticulating in the air. These differential emotional reactionspity versus fear, sympathy versus aversion-also contribute to
differences in funding streams and reimbursement for care of persons
with either of these conditions. 5
Thus, the sectors of support for research that, by the very nature of
the questions it asks, involves persons decisionally unable to provide
their own informed consent, have been composed mostly of physicianinvestigators, patient family members, and the friends of science in the
halls of the U.S. Congress and state legislatures. Those raising
concerns about the vulnerability of these subjects, and thus the need for
caution and increased protections, on the other hand, have been
disability rights advocates, medical ethicists and former decisionally-

314

See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
See Winerip supra note 154, at 45-46. The differences in social support for these two
kinds of conditions show themselves in how their care is paid for by our society. See Id.
315

Much of our tax dollars goes to taking care of persons with Alzheimer's disease. See Id.

These are the residents of our nation's nursing homes who are taken care of with Medicaid
dollars. See id According, however, to a 1998 study by The Bazelon Center for Mental
Health Law, "[fiewer than half of the Americans with schizophrenia receive adequate care" and
"spending by the 50 states on treatment for the seriously mentally ill is a third less today than it
was in the 1950s (once numbers are adjusted for inflation and population growth)." Id.
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impaired subjects, themselves 1 6 The former is a political alliance of
the strong and powerful. The latter is a political alliance of what
traditionally has been the weak and fragmented. As a result of many of
the societal, legal and medical changes that have taken place in the last
twenty years-deinstitutionalization, the disability rights movement,
increased rights of the disabled to refuse medical treatment and
limitations on our ability to institutionalize them or appoint a guardian
to make decisions for them, and the development of medications that
allow many of those with mental illnesses to function in the
community-the voices of those with mental illness and disorders that
affect the brain are now being heard. Yet,these voices are not speaking
in unison and further complicate the future of regulatory initiatives.
Longer Run Prospects-Working Toward the
Opening of the Policy Window
Given the history of controversy in this area and the sharply differing
views of many participants in the debate, inaction on the three sets of
recommendations to regulate research on the decisionally incapacitated
is not surprising. This is especially true given the inability to reach
consensus on the core ethical issue, that is, whether research that poses
more than a minimal risk may be ethically conducted on persons who
are both unable to give consent and unlikely to benefit from
participation in the research. Indeed, the most likely short-term
outcome is that the irreconcilable views of influential forces
(researchers, academic institutions, pharmaceutical manufacturers,
patient rights groups, family advocates, religious organizations) will
317
lead policymakers to view inaction as the safest course.
Yet, policy inaction does not necessarily mean that progress on
this issue will not continue. The very fact of three governmental
initiatives, ratifying simultaneously the need for greater care when
316

See Wichman, supra note 197, at 93 ('Vulnerable research subjects are paople who
are relatively or absolutely incapable of protecting their interests").
317
In that event, advocates might pursue a litigation-oriented strategy, with unpredictable

consequences. If other courts were to accept the now-vacated opinion of the intermediate
appellate court in T.D., policy change will be constitutionally compelled. See supra notes 223-

230, and accompanying text.
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capacity-impaired subjects are enrolled in research, helps change the
zeitgeist, the set of expectations that researchers and IRBs bring to the
conduct and review of this type of research. The policy proposals, or
publicity about them, may also have contributed to the phenomenon of
improved self-regulation discussed above.
Many psychiatric
researchers, for example, will pay more attention than ever to capacity
assessment and risk reduction. IRBs will continue to expand their
membership to include those who can better represent the perspective
of impaired-capacity subjects. Assent procedures will be made more
explicit. None of these changes requires regulatory or legislative
action.
That they are incommensurable does not make them
insubstantial.
Moreover, the struggles over the NBAC, Maryland, and New York
reports may be viewed as an essential, albeit often frustrating, part of
policy development. Policy change occurs, according to the trenchant
analysis of a leading political scientist, John W. Kingdon, when three
"streams of processes" come together: "(1) problem recognition, (2) the
formation and refining of policy proposals, and (3) politics." '
At
certain times, "when a policy window opens," these three streams
merge into action: "A problem is recognized, a solution is available,
[and] the political climate makes the time right for change....319
In other countries with significant biomedical research activities,
the time has been right for change. In Canada, the Tri-Council
Working Group completed and submitted its Code of Ethical Conduct
for Research Involving Humans to the Medical Research Council of
Canada (MRC), the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research
Council of Canada (NSERC), and the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) 20 This Code includes several
articles specifically limiting the conditions under which persons unable
to provide their own informed consent can be entered into research.32'

3"8 See KINGDON, supranote 233, at 87.
31
9d
20

at 88.
3 See Canadian Tri-Council Report, Code of Conductfor Research Involving Humans,
(visited32Jan. 20, 2000) <http://www.ethics.ubc.ca/code>.
1
See id
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In Europe, the Council of Europe also issued convention articles
explicitly limiting the involvement of persons in research unable to

give their own voluntary consent?'
In the United States, the very existence of the three governmental
initiatives, against a backdrop of extensive analysis and commentary in
the academic literature," suggests that research with impaired-capacity
subjects is now recognized as a problem. Still missing, as the reaction
to the initiatives demonstrates, is anything approaching consensus

about a solution. Thus, formal adoption of even modest regulatory
proposals may still be far off. In Maryland, for example, the Attorney

General recently proposed a drastically revised bill characterized by
that office as "incrementally helpful'in protecting vulnerable subjects,
not unduly burdensome to investigators or IRBs, focused on matters

that even people who disagree sharply about other things might accept
as common ground, and relatively short and uncomplicated.""
Avoiding the most controversial areas in the bill rejected earlier in the
year, the Attorney General's more recent proposal did not try to define
"legally authorized representatives" or allocate authority by reference to
risk categories. Nor did it address research advance directives. In that
respect, the proposal maintained the status quo. In essence, the
proposal merely sought to remind investigators and IRBs that they

3

Council of Europe Report, Conventionfor the Protection of Human Rights and
Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Mcdicine:
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (visited Jan. 20, 2000)
<http'//www.coe.fr/eng/legaltext/164e.htm>.
32See, e.g., Philip M. Bein, Surrogate Consent and the Incompetent Experimental
Subject, 46 FOOD DRUG COSMETIC L.J. 739 (1991); Jessica Wilen Berg, Legal and Ethical
Complexities of Consent with Cognitively Impaired Research Subjects: Proposed Guidelines,
24 J. LAW, MED & ETmics 18 (1996); Richard J. Bonnie, Research ith Cognitively Impaired
Subjects, 54 ARcHL OF GEN. PsYcwATRY 105 (1997); Even DeRenzo, Surrogate Decision
Making for Severely Cognithley Impaired Research Subjects: The Continuing Debate 3
CAMBRmIG Q. OF HEALTHCARE ETHICS 539 (1994); Even G. DeRenzo, The Ethics ofIm'olving
PsychiatricallyImpaired Persons in Research, IRB, Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 7; Rebecca Dre-zer,
Mentally DisabledResearchSubjects: The EnduringPolicyIssues, 276 JAM.tA 67 (1996); Jason
H.T. Karlawish & Greg A. Sachs, Research on the Cognitively Impaired: Lessons and
Warningsfrom the Emergency ResearchDebate, 45 J.A. GaiIATRL Soc. 474 (1997).
3 24
See Letter from Jack Schwartz, Maryland Assistant Attorney General, to Multiple
Recipients (Oct. 6, 1999) (on file with the authors).
2'See
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needed to think carefully about the welfare of these research subjects
and that they are accountable to the public for their decisions.325
Most who commented on the new proposal, including some who
had opposed the Attorney General's original proposal, agreed that it
represented a step forward, with modest benefits for subjects and no
appreciable burden on the research enterprise. The pharmaceutical
manufacturers, however, continued to oppose any additional state
regulation. Moreover, one influential patient advocacy group also
opposed the revised proposal, arguing that it was inadequate because it
did not, for example, prohibit controversial procedures like "washout"
studies.326 Under the circumstances, the Attorney General concluded
that the proposal still could not generate sufficient legislative support
and withdrew it.
This latest episode in the Maryland policymaking process
exemplifies the difficulty of trying to achieve consensus even on
narrow issues in this public, legislative debate. As Kingdon observes,
policy change can be accomplished if a proposal is "available, worked
through, and ready to go."327 This cannot now be said about research
with impaired-capacity subjects. Indeed, the core ethical disagreement
may never be resolved32 and future legislative and regulatory initiatives
3

2'See id The proposal contains a requirement for IRB review of research, whatever its

funding source, involving "decisionally incapacitated individuals" and individuals with a
"potentially incapacitating condition"; a requirement for investigators to describe their plans
for capacity assessment and assent, together with protection for subjects who refuse to assent; a

requirement for an IRB to consider the investigator's plans as well as other appropriate
measures to protect the research subjects, to document the IRB's decisions in its minutes, and
to respond to valid complaints; and provisions for public access to IRB minutes and approved
consent documents and for research subject access to research protocols, with protection for

proprietary
information. Id.
326

See supranotes 283-294, and accompanying text.
KINGDON, supra note 233, at 143.

327

32

In part, this may be a result of a lack of empirical data informing the policy debate. At
present, we do not know how many decisionally impaired individuals are harmed as a result of
their participation in research, nor do we know how the various proposals put forward would
affect actual research e.g., whether they would prevent some beneficial forms of research. See,
e.g., Letter from Laura L. Cain, Esq., Maryland Disability Law Center, to The Honorable
Waiter Baker, Senate JudicialProceedings Committee, regarding SB 307, The Decisionally

Incapacitated Research Subject Protection Act (Mar. 11, 1999) (on file with the authors)
(stating that "[we find no credible evidence to support a claim that research or advancements
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may simply be history repeated: prolonged, contentious debate
followed by inaction. Against this pessimistic view, however, must be
set both short-term gains and long-term possibilities. Actual progress
has been and likely will continue to be registered in less formal ways,
as funding agencies, academic institutions, IRBs, and researchers adopt
reforms that they regard as ethically sound and practically feasible.
This kind of incremental, ad hoc reform is likely to be responsive to
educational initiatives, the development of professional guidelines, and,
not least, the possibility (or threat) of formal regulation. Consequently,
without the pressure that efforts to achieve policy change exerts,
progress on this front may be elusive.
An additional reason for continued pursuit of a policy consensus is
that sometimes years of effort unexpectedly pay off. As Kingdon
points out, the framing of a solution that fits a problem, is broadly
endorsed by policy advocates, and is politically acceptable often takes
considerable time. Those working on possible solutions ("policy
entrepreneurs," Kingdon calls them) must be willing "to invest their
resources-time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money-in the
hope of a future return."329 Policy advocates need time to refine their
arguments, engage competing solutions, educate policymakers and the
public, float trial balloons, and assess technical feasibility and cost.
"Softening up seems to be necessary before a proposal is taken
seriously. Many good proposals have fallen on deaf ears because they
arrived before the general public, the specialized publics, or the policy
communities were ready to listen. Eventually, such a proposal might
be resurrected, but only after a period of paving the way."3 -0 Just as the
debate over DHEW's proposed rules and the National Commission's
recommendations began the "softening up" process a quarter-century
ago, so the three recent governmental initiatives carried it significantly
forward. For the sake of the research subjects to whom society owes a
special duty of care, and for the sake of the moral values that should be

in the treatment of mental disorders or impairments would halt in the abzenca of a pool of
decisionally-incapacitated subjects").
329Ky1%GDON, supra note 233, at 122.
330
Iad at 130.
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at the heart of the research enterprise, governmental agencies or bodies
should continue to develop regulatory proposals for public review and
debate.

